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THE EARNED RELEASE REVOLUTION: 
EARLY ASSESSMENTS 
AND STATE-LEVEL STRATEGIES 
JESSE J. NORRIS* 
Reacting to widespread budget crises, many states are experimenting 
with earned release (also known as “early release”) legislation to help cut 
correctional costs.  This earned release revolution is a stark reversal of 
earlier trends toward determinate sentencing.  Implementing earned 
release policies appropriately could help bring about a new sentencing era 
characterized by lower rates of incarceration and higher levels of public 
safety.  However, earned release is potentially vulnerable to abuse and 
prone to backlash, and must be planned and implemented carefully to 
avoid endangering the public, fostering injustice, or failing to realize 
hoped-for budgetary savings. 
This Article outlines a set of principles for ensuring the success of 
earned release, using Wisconsin as a case study because of its unusually 
complex array of earned release policies over the last decade.  After a 
preliminary evaluation of Wisconsin’s recent earned release policies, this 
Article presents four principles for an effective earned release system.  
Specifically, state policymakers dealing with earned release legislation 
should (a) prevent injustice by monitoring for bias and requiring 
structured, recorded decision-making; (b) provide for effective 
implementation through strategic governance; (c) ensure earned release is 
compatible with public safety; and (d) complement earned release with 
other measures designed to decrease incarceration. 
This Article also uses preliminary data to respond to recent work on 
earned release and sentence modification.  First, in response to arguments 
for the superiority of judicial rather than administrative sentence 
modification, the Article provides evidence that judicial sentence 
modification mechanisms may widen racial disparities.  Second, 
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addressing the concern that administratively-run earned release might 
exacerbate racial disparities, I show that this has not occurred in 
Wisconsin.  Finally, I demonstrate that Wisconsin’s expanded earned 
release programs, in their first full year of implementation, only released 
about 100 inmates who would not have been released that year anyway 
(about .5% of the state’s prison population).  While this does not prove 
that earned release can never be a major factor in reducing prison 
populations, it does reinforce the Article’s argument for supplementing 
earned release with other incarceration-lowering policies. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Earned release1 is on the rise nationwide.  In response to historic 
budget shortfalls in the wake of the financial crisis, numerous states 
expanded opportunities for offenders to leave prison before their 
maximum release dates, and many more are considering such plans.2  
This earned release revolution is encouraging because it is a move 
toward a criminal justice system that achieves public safety without 
relying on unnecessarily high incarceration rates.  After all, the United 
States has had the highest incarceration rate in the world since 2002, 
 
1. Earned release, as this Article employs the term, refers to any policy allowing 
offenders to be released from a confinement or community supervision sentence earlier than 
the maximum term originally imposed by the court.  The more common term “early release” 
is misleading because it suggests that offenders are released before they served the sentence 
intended by the judge.  This misunderstanding can unnecessarily prejudice the public against 
earned release.  Accordingly, some scholars avoid using the term “early release,” because 
“[l]etting offenders out after the minimum term that the judge said was appropriate is not an 
‘early’ release—it is a release before the maximum.”  Todd R. Clear & Dennis Schrantz, 
Strategies for Reducing Prison Populations, 91 PRISON J. 138S, 147S–48S (2011).  Given these 
concerns, this Article employs the term “earned release.”  Referring to the release as 
“earned” is appropriate because authorities tend to permit release before the maximum only 
for inmates with good records of behavior or success in rehabilitative programs.  The only 
exception is compassionate release, in which the inmate is released not because of anything 
he or she has done but because of his or her advanced age or “extraordinary health 
condition.”  See WIS. STAT. § 302.113(9g) (2009–2010) (stating that certain inmates serving 
bifurcated sentences may request a sentence modification if they have terminal illness).  
However, since candidates for compassionate release will have normally served several years 
of prison already, and have effectively lived out the last several years of their active lives in 
prison, one could say that they have served enough of their sentence to have “earned” the 
right to a more dignified death (or in the case of advanced age, a more dignified final phase of 
life). 
2. Angela Couloumbis, Rendell Signs Bills on Early Prison Release, PHILA. INQUIRER, 
Sept. 26, 2008, at B5 (discussing passage into law of legislation creating compassionate 
release, and a type of sentence allowing for earned release after completing certain programs 
and engaging in good behavior); Monica Davey, Safety Is Issue as Budget Cuts Free Prisoners, 
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 2010, at A1 (“[A]bout half the states . . . have tinkered with parole, early 
release programs and sentencing laws or are considering doing so.”); Gary Emerling, D.C. 
Aims to Save Money by Releasing Inmates: Up to 80 Percent Could Qualify to Leave Prison 
Early, WASH. TIMES, Apr. 2, 2009, at A1 (discussing mayor’s plan for earned release policy 
allowing as much as 80% of Washington, D.C.’s inmates to achieve earned release); John Hill, 
Fewer Behind Bars: Prison ‘Good Behavior’ Incentive Works, PROVIDENCE J., Dec. 12, 2009, 
at A1 (discussing new sentence credit policy expanding the amount of credit inmates can earn 
for good behavior); SB 500 a Step in Prison Reform, SEACOAST ONLINE (Feb. 28, 2010), 
http://www.seacoastonline.com/articles/20100228-OPINION-2280313 (discussing New 
Hampshire proposed legislation requiring release of inmates with good behavior after serving 
their minimum sentence). 
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many times the rate of any other democratic, industrialized country.3  
Yet these new earned release policies have already sparked a political 
backlash in some states, in a few cases resulting in their cancellation or 
suspension.4  Despite these problems, today’s budgetary realities, 
together with a widespread shift away from tough-on-crime policies, 
suggest that earned release could continue to spread. 
This raises a vital question for state policymakers: how can the state 
plan and implement earned release in a way that results in significant 
cost savings without harming public safety or causing other problems?  
This question is exceedingly important, not only because it affects public 
safety, but also because the way it is answered will affect the trajectory 
of criminal justice reform across the country.  Besides increasing risks to 
the public, poorly implemented earned release policies could foster 
injustice, widen racial and geographic sentencing disparities, weaken 
confidence in the criminal justice system, and lead to confusion and 
frustration among inmates and criminal justice actors.5  Such outcomes 
could cause a backlash that stalls or reverses the process of criminal 
 
3. Sara Wakefield, Invisible Inequality, Million Dollar Blocks, and Extra-Legal 
Punishment: A Review of Recent Contributions to Mass Incarceration Scholarship, 12 
PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y 209, 209 (2010).  As of 2007, 756 of every 100,000 people in the United 
States were incarcerated.  ROY WALMSLEY, WORLD PRISON POPULATION LIST 1, 3 tbl.2 
(8th ed. 2009).  Among Canada, Australia, and the major countries of Northern and Western 
Europe, the incarceration rate per 100,000 ranges from 63 (in Denmark) to 153 (in the United 
Kingdom).  Id. at 3–5 tbls.2–5.  Particular populations are incarcerated at considerably higher 
rates.  For example, the U.S. African-American male incarceration rate is 4,749 per 100,000, 
six times the rate for white males.  HEATHER C. WEST, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, 
PRISON INMATES AT MIDYEAR 2009—STATISTICAL TABLES 1, 21 tbl.18 (2010).   
4. John O’Connor, Illinois Ends Secret Prison-Release Plan, SEATTLE TIMES, Dec. 15, 
2009, http://www.seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/nationworld/2010638353_apusprisonssecret 
release.html (describing an unpublicized process of earned release that gave inmates “good 
time” credit before they had earned it, resulting in some offenders being released after less 
than two weeks of confinement); Release of Inmates to Stop; Lawmakers Must Find Funds, 
KY. POST, Feb. 1, 2003, at 1K; see also supra notes 57–59 and accompanying text (noting the 
recent backlash and reform that took place in Wisconsin).  For a discussion disputing many of 
the claims made by critics of the Illinois early release program, including the claim that the 
releases were secret or endangered the public, see MALCOLM C. YOUNG, BLUHM LEGAL 
CLINIC NORTHWESTERN UNIV. SCHOOL OF LAW, SETTING THE RECORD STRAIGHT: THE 
TRUTH ABOUT “EARLY RELEASE” FROM ILLINOIS PRISONS 16–17 (2010), available at 
http://blogs.chicagotribune.com/files/setting-the-record-straight.pdf. 
5. See infra III.A.1. and III.B.1. 
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justice reform, leaving the country mired semi-permanently in the 
incarceration-focused, “tough-on-crime” paradigm of the 1990s.6 
This Article answers the question posed above by analyzing the 
earned release mechanisms of a single state, Wisconsin, and drawing on 
its lessons, as well as scholarly sources, to formulate tentative general 
principles for successful earned release policies.  Wisconsin is a fitting 
case study because of its recent experience with several distinct 
sentencing regimes, and the unusually large number of earned release 
mechanisms that have been in effect at some point over the last decade. 
Recent earned release reforms have been the subject of relatively 
little research.  Since legislation expanding earned release has not 
become popular until recently, few empirical analyses of these policies 
exist.7  Professor Cecelia Klingele advocates for judicial sentence 
modification as a potentially more transparent, sustainable, and 
accountability-enhancing form of earned release.8  In another article, 
Professor Klingele analyzes the “early demise of early release” in some 
states and articulates three principles to guide earned release policies.9  
This Article, while in broad agreement with Professor Klingele’s 
analysis in her latter article, develops a complementary approach 
focusing on different issues.10  Professor Kelly Hannah-Moffat’s 
forthcoming article analyzes the use of risk assessment tools in general 
 
6. See Sheila R. Rule, Prisons, Crime and Budgets: Time for a New Paradigm, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 10, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/sheila-r-rule/prisons-
crime-and-budgets_b_834079.html. 
7. See Clear & Schrantz, supra note 1, at 138S (“Although there has been a great deal of 
policy activity trying to reduce the size of prison populations, especially in the last few years, 
very little of this activity has received rigorous evaluation.”).  Most of the existing academic 
literature analyzes relatively narrow issues, such as current proposals for “second-look” 
judicial earned release and compassionate release.  See, e.g., William W. Berry III, 
Extraordinary and Compelling: A Re-Examination of the Justifications for Compassionate 
Release, 68 MD. L. REV. 850 (2009) (discussing rationale for compassionate release and 
evaluating when compassionate release is proper); Richard F. Frase, Second Look Provisions 
in the Proposed Model Penal Code Revisions, 21 FED. SENT’G REP. 194, 194–202 (2009). 
8. Cecelia Klingele, Changing the Sentence Without Hiding the Truth: Judicial Sentence 
Modification as a Promising Method of Early Release, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 465, 514–20 
(2010) [hereinafter Klingele, Changing the Sentence]. 
9. Cecelia Klingele, The Early Demise of Early Release, 114 W. VA. L. REV. 415 (2012) 
[hereinafter Klingele, Early Demise]. 
10. For example, Klingele discusses the need to acknowledge limits to institutional 
capacity, present the case for earned release in moral terms (rather than selling it as a 
budgetary fix), and to further develop the principles underlying earned release.  Without 
disputing these principles, this Article offers a more “instrumental” (as Professor Klingele 
puts it) approach to guiding earned release policy.  Id. at 450–58.  
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and contends that their use may help achieve lower prison populations, 
presumably by facilitating earned release when the risk for recidivism is 
low.11 
Professor Bernard Harcourt, responding to Hannah-Moffat, 
contends that policymakers should focus on reducing prison admission 
rather than increasing earned release.12  His argument is based on the 
prediction that risk assessment tools used to inform earned release 
decisions will be biased against minorities, and on empirical research 
showing that prison admissions, and not sentence length, were the real 
driver behind increasing prison populations.13 
This Article makes four contributions to the literature on earned 
release.  First, in response to Professor Klingele’s argument for 
increasing the role of judges in earned release, I argue that 
administrators should hold most of the responsibility for earned release 
decisions.  As part of this argument, I present preliminary empirical data 
demonstrating extreme geographical disparities in one of Wisconsin’s 
judicial earned release mechanisms, which may have contributed to 
Wisconsin’s already abysmal racial disparities in imprisonment.14 
Second, to address Professor Harcourt’s concerns, I use recent data 
to demonstrate that the implementation of the earned release 
mechanisms in effect from 2009, which was administered chiefly by state 
officials with the aid of risk assessment tools, was not racially skewed.15  
However, these earned release programs accounted for only about 5% 
 
11. Kelly Hannah-Moffat, Actuarial Sentencing: An “Unsettled” Proposition 
CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y (forthcoming 2012) (manuscript at 3, 4, 10, 30). 
12. Bernard Harcourt, Risk as a Proxy for Race, 11 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 
(forthcoming 2012) (manuscript at 2, 9). 
13. Id. 
14. As of 2002, Wisconsin incarcerated a higher percentage of its African-American 
population than any other state, according to statistics produced by the federal government.  
Black Incarceration Here Highest in U.S., CAP. TIMES (Madison, Wis.), Apr. 11, 2002, at 4A.  
Wisconsin is also among the five states with the highest ratio between African-American and 
white imprisonment rates.  MARC MAUER & RYAN S. KING, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, 
UNEVEN JUSTICE: STATE RATES OF INCARCERATION BY RACE AND ETHNICITY 10 tbl.5 
(2007), available at http://www.sentencingproject.org/Admin\Documents\publications\Crd_ 
stateratesofincbyraceandethnicity.pdf.  Moreover, Wisconsin has the nation’s highest racial 
disparity for drug crime sentences.  Crocker Stephenson, State Leads in Prison Drug Gap, 
MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, May 6, 2008, at A1.  See COMM’N ON REDUCING RACIAL 
DISPARITIES IN THE WIS. JUSTICE SYSTEM, FINAL REPORT (2008), available at 
ftp://doaftp04.doa.state.wi.us/doadocs/web.pdf, for a discussion on ways to reduce Wisconsin’s 
racial disparity in the criminal justice system. 
15. See infra note 250–253. 
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of the releases that occurred during their existence, and most of the 
releases only reduced the inmate’s prison sentence by a year or less.16  
Only 107 inmates released through an earned release mechanism in 2010 
(corresponding to about 0.5% of the state’s prison population) would 
not have been released that year anyway.17  These results support this 
Article’s argument that, because earned release may, in many cases, 
have a relatively small impact on incarceration, states need to 
complement earned release with other policies reducing prison 
admissions. 
The third and most general contribution of this Article is that it 
analyzes earned release policy in a uniquely comprehensive way, 
outlining basic principles for prudent and effective implementation.18  
Finally, this Article’s discussion of the Wisconsin reforms is the first 
detailed evaluation of a state’s recent earned release legislation since the 
beginning of the earned release revolution. 
Part II provides background on national trends in sentencing reform, 
including the recent spread of earned release legislation; briefly 
overviews Wisconsin’s five sentencing eras; and outlines the current 
earned release mechanisms in Wisconsin’s criminal justice system.  In 
Part III, this Article evaluates Wisconsin’s earned release reforms of 
2009 and 2011, describing both positive elements and some issues of 
concern.  On the positive side, Wisconsin’s 2009 reforms reduced the 
judicial role in most earned release mechanisms, significantly broadened 
the scope of compassionate release, were careful to avoid endangering 
public safety, allowed for modification of community supervision 
(parole and extended supervision) sentences, and took initial steps to 
address offender reentry and to reduce revocation rates for those 
serving community supervision sentences.19  The uneven implementation 
and funding of these policies, the imperfect communication with the 
judiciary, and the complexity and large number of the mechanisms are 
causes for concern with the 2009 policies.20  
 
16. E-mail from Anthony Streveler, Wis. Dep’t of Corr., to author (Jan. 27, 2012). 
17. Id.  The average daily prison population in 2010 was 20,015.  Dee J. Hall, Behind 
Bars in Wisconsin: Prison Population Drops 13.6%, WIS. STATE J., Jan. 13, 2011, at A1. 
18. This Article is the first to do so, with the exception of Klingele’s complementary 
article.  See supra notes 9–10 and accompanying text. 
19. See infra Part III.A. 
20. See infra Part III.A.5–.7. 
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Wisconsin’s 2011 legislation abolished several of its 2009 earned 
release mechanisms and gave judges a stronger role in earned release, 
but retained the broadened scope of compassionate release, the policy 
focuses on reducing revocation and recidivism rates, and the ability to 
modify probation sentences.21  As part of its analysis of these changes, 
this Article argues that while there are a variety of defensible earned 
release arrangements, executive branch actors should have most of the 
responsibility for earned release, with judges playing a secondary, more 
limited role. 
Drawing on Wisconsin’s experience and recent criminal justice and 
governance research, this Article then presents four tentative principles 
to guide the successful design and implementation of earned release 
legislation in other states.  Specifically, state policymakers dealing with 
earned release legislation should (a) prevent injustice by monitoring for 
bias and requiring structured, recorded decision-making; (b) ensure 
effective implementation through strategic governance; (c) prevent 
earned release from harming public safety; and (d) complement earned 
release with other measures designed to decrease incarceration in ways 
consistent with public safety.  Implemented in this way, earned release 
can play an important role in moving toward a new, more sustainable 
sentencing era involving less incarceration and enhanced public safety.  
In addition to these benefits, this approach to earned release could help 
bring the rule of law to sentencing decisions, thereby correcting the 
long-lamented “lawlessness” of sentencing.22  Part IV briefly summarizes 
this Article’s arguments, and discusses promising areas for future 
scholarship. 
II.  EARNED RELEASE: NATIONAL TRENDS AND WISCONSIN’S 
CURRENT SYSTEM 
A.  Earned Release’s Rapid Rise 
During the 1990s, most U.S. states shifted from an indeterminate 
sentencing system—in which parole boards had wide latitude to release 
inmates—to determinate systems requiring inmates to serve far larger 
proportions of their sentence.23  Though described as “truth-in-
 
21. See, e.g., 2011 Wis. Act 38, § 93b (amending WIS. STAT. § 973.09(3)(d)(intro.) to give 
the sentencing court the authority to modify an inmate’s period of probation). 
22. See infra Part III.B.1.b. 
23. PAULA M. DITTON & DORIS J. WILSON, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF 
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sentencing,” these measures did not set sentences in stone.  Rather, 
states adopting determinate sentencing still employed earned release 
mechanisms such as parole and sentence credit for good behavior.24  By 
the year 2000, of the forty-two states that had adopted truth-in-
sentencing practices, twenty-nine of them required inmates to serve only 
85% of their sentences—the level required to receive federal funding 
under one federal program.25  Several other states required less: four 
states only required 50%, and three states required between 50% and 
85%.26 
Truth-in-sentencing and other “tough-on-crime” policies, combined 
with a mild economic recession, caused many states to experience severe 
budget crises and prison overcrowding in the early 2000s.27  In response, 
over thirty states enacted major reforms that cut costs by reducing 
prison populations and combated recidivism by investing more 
resources in drug treatment, intensive community supervision, and other 
measures.28  As part of this trend, some states revised their truth-in-
sentencing schemes to reduce incarceration.  Eight states introduced 
new earned release provisions, and twenty states scaled back mandatory 
minimum sentencing laws or other harsh penalties.29  These widespread 
 
JUSTICE STATISTICS SPECIAL REPORT: TRUTH IN SENTENCING IN STATE PRISONS 1–3 
(1999), available at http://bjsdata.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/tssp.pdf. 
24. Id. at 1. 
25. Id. at 2 tbl.1, 3; Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 13701–04 (2006) (referring to violent offenders). 
26. DITTON & WILSON, supra note 23, at 2. 
27. See JUDITH A. GREENE, FAMILIES AGAINST MANDATORY MINIMUMS, POSITIVE 
TRENDS IN STATE-LEVEL SENTENCING AND CORRECTIONAL POLICY 6 (2003), available at 
www.famm.org/Repository/Files/82751_Positive%20Trends.pdf (describing recent trends in 
criminal justice reforms at the state level as a result of state budget crises); JUDITH GREENE 
& KEVIN PRANIS, JUSTICE STRATEGIES, TREATMENT INSTEAD OF PRISONS: A ROADMAP 
FOR SENTENCING AND CORRECTIONAL POLICY REFORM IN WISCONSIN 58–59 (2006), 
available at http://www.csdp.org/research/Wisconsin_Report_Treatment_Instead_of_Prisons 
_Jan_06.pdf. 
28. GREENE & PRANIS, supra note 27, at 58–59. 
29. Id.; see also ALISON LAWRENCE, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE 
LEGISLATURES, STATE SENTENCING AND CORRECTIONS LEGISLATION 2007 ACTION, 2008 
OUTLOOK 10–13 (2008), available at http://www.ncsl.org/print/cj/07sentencingreport.pdf 
(outlining recent and forthcoming changes to corrections and sentencing policy at the state 
level); JON WOOL & DON STEMEN, VERA INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, CHANGING FORTUNES OR 
CHANGING ATTITUDES? SENTENCING AND CORRECTIONS REFORMS IN 2003, at 2–7 (2004), 
available at http://www.vera.org/publication_pdf/226_431.pdf (discussing 2003 changes in 
state-level sentencing policy); Fox Butterfield, With Cash Tight, States Reassess Long Jail 
Terms, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 2003, at A1. 
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reforms have prompted observers to speak of a shift from the “tough-
on-crime” mentality of the 1990s to a “smart-on-crime” paradigm.30 
With the 2008 financial meltdown and the ensuing deep recession, 
budgetary pressures on states increased dramatically, setting off a new 
wave of criminal justice reform.31  These reforms have involved various 
elements, but earned release is probably the most visible and prominent, 
and certainly the most controversial, cost-saving strategy.  Numerous 
states have recently passed earned release reforms—amounting to 
thirty-six states in the last decade—and others are considering such 
legislation.32  In several states, earned release policies have already come 
 
30. GREENE, supra note 27, at 5.  This trend is also consistent with the “rule-of-law 
sentencing” approach, which seeks to promote well-reasoned sentencing decisions and a 
strategic restructuring of corrections, both based on using the tools most likely to achieve just 
punishment and public safety.  See Michael E. Smith & Walter J. Dickey, Reforming 
Sentencing and Corrections for Just Punishment and Public Safety, in SENTENCING & 
CORRECTIONS: ISSUES FOR THE 21ST CENTURY, at 1, 5–6 (Papers from the Executive 
Sessions on Sentencing and Corrections No. 4), available at 
http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/175724.pdf. 
31. As the Detroit News observed,  
 
Kentucky, Minnesota, New York, Rhode Island, Texas and Washington are among 
more than a dozen states that tweaked their sentencing structure in 2009—from 
raising the bar on what constitutes a felony, to narrowing the definition of a habitual 
offender or removing mandatory minimum sentences for some crimes.   
At the same time, states are investing more in programs—from mental health 
services, to substance abuse treatment and job training—that research has shown to 
reduce recidivism . . . .”   
Karen Bouffard, Gov’s Plan to Release Inmates Under Fire, DETROIT NEWS, Mar. 8, 2010, at 
A1 (discussing the Michigan governor’s legislative proposals to increase opportunities for 
earned release and the already-enacted increase in parole release). 
32. See id.; Michael M. O’Hear, Beyond Rehabilitation: A New Theory of Indeterminate 
Sentencing, 48 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1247 app. at 1288–92 (2011) (presenting a comprehensive 
chart of recent earned release reforms at the state level); Michael M. O’Hear, The Early-
Release Renaissance: Reflections and a Legislative Update, MARQ. UNIV. L. SCH. FACULTY 
BLOG (Feb. 25, 2011), http://law.marquette.edu/facultyblog/2011/02/25/the-early-release-
renaissance-reflections-and-a-legislative-update/; see also JUDITH GREENE & MARC MAUER, 
THE SENTENCING PROJECT, DOWNSCALING PRISONS: LESSONS FROM FOUR STATES (2010), 
available at http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/publications/inc_downscaling 
prisons2010.pdf (examining how four states—New York, Michigan, New Jersey, and 
Kansas—have significantly reduced their prison population and thus the cost of operating 
their respective prison systems); CHRISTINE S. SCOTT-HAYWARD, VERA INSTITUTE OF 
JUSTICE, THE FISCAL CRISIS IN CORRECTIONS: RETHINKING POLICIES AND PRACTICES 9–
11 (2009) (discussing changes some states have made in the length of prison terms to help cut 
costs); Klingele, Changing the Sentence, supra note 8, at 485–94 (discussing the rise of 
different types of earned release mechanisms in various states). 
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under fire for allegedly endangering public safety.33  But the cumulative 
impact of earned release and other reforms has resulted in the 
stabilization of the U.S. prison population, which actually dropped 
slightly in 2010.34  Some states, including Wisconsin, experienced 
significant decreases in imprisonment.35 
For the purposes of this Article, I assume that public safety can be 
increased even while reducing the prison population, that some form of 
earned release is justified and necessary, and that the nation would 
benefit from the establishment of a new sentencing era.36  This smart-on-
crime era would be characterized by falling incarceration levels, 
increased opportunities for earned release, widespread reliance on 
alternatives to incarceration, and substantial investments in programs 
proven effective in preventing crime and integrating offenders into 
society.37  Transitioning to such an era is all the more urgent given the 
growing evidence of the general harmfulness of over-incarceration and, 
 
33. See Klingele, Early Demise, supra note 9, at 429–39 (analyzing cases of failed earned 
release policies); Dee J. Hall & Mary Spicuzza, Slow Start to Earned Release: State’s New 
Prison Program Draws Criticism for Robbing Judges of Sentencing Power and a Failure to 
Realize Savings, WIS. STATE J., Mar. 21, 2010, at A1. 
34. Hall, supra note 17 (noting a drop in the nation’s state prisoner population in 2010, 
the first drop in 38 years). 
35. Id. 
36. See ALISON LAWRENCE, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGIS., CUTTING 
CORRECTIONS COSTS: EARNED TIME POLICIES FOR STATE PRISONERS 1–4 (2009), 
available  at  http://www.pewcenteronthestates.org/uploadedFiles/Earned_time_report_ 
%20NCSL.pdf?n=6022; Clear & Schrantz, supra note 1, at 152S–53S (discussing ways to 
reduce prison populations and the public safety implications).  See generally Nora V. 
Demleitner, Editor’s Note, Replacing Incarceration: The Need for Dramatic Change, 22 FED. 
SENT’G REP. 1 (2009) (discussing the need for dramatically lowering the federal prison 
population while focusing on improving public safety, and strategies for accomplishing this); 
Ben Trachtenberg, Note, State Sentencing Policy and New Prison Admissions, 38 U. MICH. 
J.L. REFORM 479 (2005) (analyzing factors influencing lower rates of imprisonment in certain 
U.S. states, and making recommendations for lowering prison populations generally). 
37. See generally Jim Webb, Why We Must Fix Our Prisons, PARADE (Mar. 29, 2009), 
http://www.parade.com/news/2009/03/why-we-must-fix-our-prisons.html (“With so many of 
our citizens in prison compared with the rest of the world, there are only two possibilities: 
Either we are home to the most evil people on earth or we are doing something different—
and vastly counterproductive.  Obviously, the answer is the latter.”).  America’s higher rates 
of incarceration are caused mainly by government policies, not differing crime rates.  See 
MARC MAUER, RACE TO INCARCERATE 33 (2d ed. 2006); Francis T. Cullen, Cheryl Lero 
Jonson & Daniel S. Nagin, Prisons Do Not Reduce Recidivism: The High Cost of Ignoring 
Science, 91 PRISON J. 48S, 54S–60S (2011) (reviewing research showing the lack of evidence 
that prisons reduce recidivism, and presenting some evidence that imprisonment increases 
crime). 
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in particular, incarceration’s devastating effect on African-American 
individuals and communities.38 
The present economic and political climate is ideal for ambitious 
reforms of this nature.  There have long been voices on the left calling 
for major criminal justice reform.  But now even conservative 
Republicans, such as Newt Gingrich and Grover Norquist, have begun a 
national campaign (dubbed “Right on Crime”) focused on “intelligently 
reducing” the prison population.39 
Earned release policies are potentially important in bringing about a 
new sentencing era, and not just because their botched implementation 
might lead to a return to tough-on-crime policies, which could drive the 
country’s unnecessarily high incarceration rates even higher.40  They are 
also important because they can help lower prison populations, motivate 
offenders to cooperate with rehabilitative programs and engage in 
 
38. See, e.g., MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN 
THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 7 (2010); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, TARGETING BLACKS: 
DRUG LAW ENFORCEMENT AND RACE IN THE UNITED STATES (2008), available at 
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/us0508_1.pdf (reviewing racial discrimination in 
the War on Drugs); Katherine Beckett et al., Drug Use, Drug Possession Arrests, and the 
Question of Race: Lessons from Seattle, 52 SOC. PROBS. 419, 436 (2005) (demonstrating that 
racist assumptions, and not legitimate policy considerations, cause the disproportionate 
enforcement of drug laws on African-Americans in Seattle); Klingele, Early Demise, supra 
note 9, at 418–22 (analyzing the “problem of overincarceration”); Marc Mauer, Addressing 
Racial Disparities in Incarceration, 91 PRISON J. 87S, 91S–95S (2011) (discussing evidence for 
racial bias at each decision point in the criminal justice system); Jesse J. Norris, State Efforts 
to Reduce Racial Disparities in Criminal Justice: Empirical Analysis and Recommendations for 
Action, 47 GONZAGA L. REV. 493 (2012); Devah Pager, Bruce Western & Bart Bonikowski, 
Discrimination in a Low-Wage Labor Market: A Field Experiment, 74 AM. SOC. REV. 777, 
789–90 (2009) (recognizing that discrimination against ex-felons can be worse for blacks than 
whites); Becky Pettit & Bruce Western, Mass Imprisonment and the Life Course: Race and 
Class Inequality in U.S. Incarceration, 69 AM. SOC. REV. 151 (2004) (documenting the 
astoundingly high rates of black imprisonment); Michael Tonry & Matthew Melewski, The 
Malign Effects of Drug and Crime Control Policies on Black Americans, 37 CRIME & JUST. 1 
(2008) (documenting the negative effects of drug policies on black communities); see also 
INTERN’L CTR. FOR SCIENCE IN DRUG POL’Y, EFFECT OF DRUG LAW ENFORCEMENT ON 
DRUG-RELATED VIOLENCE: EVIDENCE FROM A SCIENTIFIC REVIEW 15 (2010), available at 
http://www.iscsdp.org/docs /ICSDP-1%20-20%FINAL.pdf (reviewing evidence that enforcing 
drug laws actually increases violence); Katherine Beckett, Kris Nyrop & Lori Pfingst, Race, 
Drugs, and Policing: Understanding Disparities in Drug Delivery Arrests, 44 CRIMINOLOGY 
105, 107–09 (2006) (demonstrating that racist assumptions may have a role in the 
disproportionate enforcement of drug laws on African-Americans in Seattle). 
39. Newt Gingrich & Pat Nolan, Prison Reform: A Smart Way for States to Save Money 
and Lives, WASH. POST, Jan. 7, 2011, www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011 
/01/06/AR2011010604386.html. 
40. See supra Part I. 
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serious post-release planning, and stimulate policymakers to build and 
improve upon programs facilitating offender reentry into society.41  At 
the same time—as argued in Part III—states should not rely exclusively 
on earned release, which can be less effective and sustainable than other 
complementary reforms that reduce prison admissions. 
B.  Wisconsin: Five Sentencing Systems in Twelve Years 
Remarkably, Wisconsin has experienced five distinct sentencing 
systems within twelve years.  Until December 31, 1999, an indeterminate 
sentencing system—paradoxically still referred to as the “new law”—
made inmates eligible for discretionary parole release after serving 25% 
of their sentences or a minimum of six months.42  Inmates usually had to 
be released after serving two-thirds of their sentences.43 
Beginning in the year 2000, Wisconsin switched to a completely 
different system, sentencing all felons under a determinate sentencing 
scheme known as “truth-in-sentencing.”44  Under truth-in-sentencing 
(TIS), which is still in force today despite several changes in the past 
decade, courts impose a “bifurcated sentence” by specifying the precise 
periods of imprisonment and extended supervision (the term used 
instead of “parole”).45  From 2000 to October 2009, the Parole 
Commission played no part in TIS inmates’ release, and “good time,” 
which reduced prison terms for good behavior, no longer existed.46   
 
41. See supra notes 29, 32, 36, 38 and accompanying text. 
42. See WIS. STAT. § 302.11 (2007–2008).  For certain “serious” felonies, the mandatory 
release date was only “presumptive,” and thus the Parole Commission had the option of not 
releasing the inmate after serving two-thirds of the sentence.  Id. § 302.11(1g).  Disciplinary 
infractions could extend inmate’s mandatory release date.  Id. § 302.11(2).  The “old law” 
refers to the previous indeterminate sentencing system, which applies to offenders who 
committed crimes before June 1, 1984.  Meredith Ross, Sentence Modification and Early 
Release for TIS Inmates, WIS. DEFENDER, Winter/Spring 2005, at 4, 4 & n.4, available at 
http://www.wisspd.org/html/publications/WdefWinSpr05/ WinSpr2005.pdf. 
43. WIS. STAT. § 302.11(1) (1995–1996). 
44. WIS. STAT. § 973.01(1), (6) (2009–2010) (specifying that offenders who commit 
crimes on or after that date are not eligible for parole); see also Brenda R. Mayrack, Note, 
The Implications of State ex rel. Thomas v. Schwartz for Wisconsin Sentencing Policy After 
Truth-in-Sentencing II, 2008 WIS. L. REV. 181, 191–94. 
45. WIS. STAT. § 973.01(2) (2009–2010). 
46. 1997 Wis. Act 283, § 419(4); WIS. STAT. § 973.01(6) (2009–2010) (indicating parole 
release is unavailable for inmates sentenced under truth-in-sentencing); WIS. STAT. 
§ 973.01(4) (indicating the inapplicability of “good time” to truth-in-sentencing inmates). 
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During the TIS-I period, from 2000 to 2003, Wisconsin’s sentencing 
system was among the most restrictive in the nation.47  Inmates had to 
serve every day of their sentences, and potentially more because 
negative conduct reports actually increase sentences.48  Only Wisconsin 
and Alaska required inmates to serve 100% of the sentence.49  
Moreover, in a number of states TIS applied only to violent crimes, but 
in Wisconsin it applied to all felonies.50  In Wisconsin, as in other states, 
truth-in-sentencing legislation led to serious budgetary problems, 
prompting the revaluation and reform of sentencing policy.  As critics 
predicted,51 Wisconsin’s truth-in-sentencing sharply increased sentences, 
potentially costing the state billions of dollars.52 
 
47. See GREENE & PRANIS, supra note 27, at 17. 
48. WIS. STAT. § 302.11(2) (2007–2008). 
49. Id.; ALASKA STAT. §§ 12.55.125(f) (Supp. 2009); ALASKA STAT. § 33.20.010(a) 
(2010); WIS. STAT. § 973.01(4), (6) (2007–2008). 
50. WIS. STAT. § 973.01(1) (2011).  For example, Georgia restricts truth-in-sentencing to 
the “seven deadly sins”: violent offenses for which inmates are ineligible for parole.  
TIMOTHY CARR, “TRUTH IN SENTENCING” IN GEORGIA (2008), available at 
http://www.dcor.state.ga.us/pdf/TruthInSentencing.pdf.  In 2002, several other states, 
including Kentucky, Maryland, New York, and Oklahoma, had abolished parole only for 
violent offenders or certain violent offenders.  See RE-ENTRY POLICY COUNCIL, Parole 
Status by State, http://reentrypolicy.org/jc_publications/parole_status_by_state;file (last visited 
Feb. 15, 2012).  Mississippi recently narrowed its truth-in-sentencing system to exempt many 
drug offenders.  See MISS. CODE ANN. § 47-7-3(1)(h) (2011).  In Connecticut, nonviolent 
offenders must serve 75% of their sentences before being eligible for parole, while some 
violent offenders must serve 85%, and the worst violent offenders must serve 100% of their 
sentences.  CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-125a (West 2009).  Pennsylvania recently restored 
parole for nonviolent offenders.  Press Release, Chuck Ardo, PA Governor Rendell Orders 
Continuation of Parole of Non-Violent Offenders (Oct. 20, 2008), available at 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2008/10/20/idUS225719+20-Oct-2008+PRN20081020.  The 
federal grant system that encouraged the adoption of truth-in-sentencing only required states 
to apply it to violent crimes.  42 U.S.C. § 13704 (2006). 
51. For example, University of Wisconsin Law School Professor Walter J. Dickey wrote 
that truth-in-sentencing would likely necessitate new prison construction, though he 
acknowledged that no one really knew what the result of the legislation would be.  Walter J. 
Dickey, Thinking Strategically About Correctional Resources, 2000 WIS. L. REV. 279, 279 
(introducing Timothy Edwards, The Theory and Practice of Compulsory Drug Treatment in 
the Criminal Justice System: The Wisconsin Experiment, 2000 WIS. L. REV. 283); WISCONSIN 
CRIMINAL PENALTIES STUDY COMMITTEE, FINAL REPORT, at xvii (1999) (summarizing 
Walter J. Dickey’s dissent). 
52. For discussion on how this “inadvertent lengthening of sentences” may have cost the 
state billions of dollars, see Steven Elbow, Democrats Want to Reduce State’s Ballooning 
Prison Population, CAP. TIMES (Madison, Wis.) (Dec. 3, 2009), 
http://host.madison.com/ct/news/local/govt_and_politics/article_a8068f6a-13ac-5700-bf49-
82f6172b1675.html (estimating costs of $2.5 billion between 1999 and 2019); Mary Zahn & 
Gina Barton, $1.8 Billion, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Nov. 21, 2004, at A1; and Editorial, 
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Budgetary savings were one of the main motivations behind 
revisions to truth-in-sentencing, known as TIS-II, which brought about 
the third sentencing system since 1999.  When Governor Scott 
McCallum signed the TIS-II legislation in 2002, he described the 
legislation as “avoid[ing] millions of dollars in additional incarceration 
costs[,] . . . creat[ing] a mechanism to reward prisoner rehabilitation[, 
and] allow[ing] consideration of cost-effective alternatives to prison 
. . . .”53  TIS-II lowered maximum penalties for some crimes and 
established new earned release mechanisms, including sentence 
adjustment, compassionate release, and earned release through two 
rehabilitative programs.54 
Wisconsin’s 2009 earned release reforms, inaugurating the fourth 
sentencing system within a decade, were even more dramatic.  Passed as 
part of budgetary legislation in 2009, these TIS-III or “Act 28” measures 
created several new earned release mechanisms.55  The general effect of 
the legislation was to shift most of the power over earned release 
decisions from judges to state officials, including the Earned Release 
Review Commission (ERRC)—formerly known as the Parole 
Commission—and the Department of Corrections (DOC). 
 
Reform Truth in Sentencing, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL., Nov. 28, 2004, at J4.  Over the last 
decade, Wisconsin’s prison population has increased by 14%, and is expected to increase 
another 25% by 2019 if measures are not taken to stem this growth.  Elbow, supra. 
53. Gov. Veto Message, SSJR2AB1, 2001 Legis. Bill Hist. WI A.B. 1, 2002 Spec. Sess., 
(Wis. 2002). 
54. 2001 Wis. Act 109, § 1143m (amending WIS. STAT. § 973.195 (2009–2010) to its 
current form); WIS. STAT. § 302.113(9g) (2007–2008) (allowing inmates who are over age 
sixty-five and have served five years or who are over sixty and have served ten years, or who 
have a prognosis of less than six months to live, to apply to a judge for sentence reduction if 
first approved by the prison’s Program Review Committee); WIS. STAT. § 302.045(2) (2007–
2008) (providing for earned release after completing the Challenge Incarceration Program); 
WIS. STAT. § 302.05(3) (2007–2008); WIS. STAT. § 973.01(3g) (2007–2008) (allowing for 
earned release after completing the Earned Release Program).  The Challenge Incarceration 
Program was created in 1991, 1991 Wis. Act 39, § 3131q, but only with the advent of truth-in-
sentencing in 2000 did completing the program entitle the inmate (whether sentenced under 
truth-in-sentencing or the old system) to earned release.  1997 Wis. Act 283, §§ 195, 196 
(creating WIS. STAT. §§ 302.045(3), (3m) (1997–1998)).  The Wisconsin substance abuse 
program was created in 1989, but became an automatic earned release program (called 
Earned Release Program) after legislation passed in 2003.  See 2003 Wis. Act 33, § 2505 
(creating WIS. STAT. § 302.05(3) (2003–2004)).  Since it only occurred one year later, this 2003 
legislation could be considered part of the TIS-II legislation. 
55. See, e.g., 2009 Wis. Act 28, § 25 (creating WIS. STAT. § 15.01(2) (2009–2010)); 2009 
Wis. Act 28, § 27 (creating WIS. STAT. §15.06(6) (2009–2010)); see also infra Part II.B. 
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The most recent change, ushering in the fifth sentencing regime in 
twelve years, was the result of Wisconsin’s 2010 Republican landslide, 
which brought Governor Scott Walker to power and gave Republicans 
majorities in both houses of the Wisconsin legislature.56  Governor 
Walker had campaigned on a promise to end earned release, and in mid-
2011, a broad swath of measures was finally enacted.57  This legislation 
abolished most of the earned release mechanisms created in 2009, and 
shifted most of the earned-release decision-making power from the 
executive branch to judges, while retaining a small sub-set of the 2009 
reforms.58 
C.  Earned Release Mechanisms for Wisconsin State Prisoners 
This Part provides an overview of the statutory mechanisms through 
which Wisconsin state prisoners can currently be released before the 
maximum term of their sentence, as well as the mechanisms that were 
created in 2009 and abolished in 2011.59  Five statutory forms of earned 
release are presently available to at least some inmates: (1) parole 
release, (2) compassionate release, (3) program-based mechanisms, (4) 
sentence adjustment due to age or extraordinary health condition, and 
(5) earned release from probation.  Another five statutory earned 
release mechanisms were abolished in 2011: (1) ERRC release, (2) 
positive adjustment time, (3) risk reduction sentence, (4) “certain” 
earned release, and (5) earned release from  extended supervision.60 
 
56. Jessica Vanegeren, GOP Sweep Likely Means More State Furloughs, Fewer on 
BadgerCare, CAP. TIMES (Madison, Wis.) (Nov. 3, 2010), http://host.madison.com/ct/news 
/local/govt-and-politics/elections/article_69f86356-e74d-11df-b068-001cc4c002e0.html. 
57. See 2011 Wis. Act 38; see also Patrick Marley, Walker Signs Bill Repealing Early 
Release, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL (July 19, 2011), http://www.jsonline.com/news/statepolitics 
/125814448.html; Steve Schultze, Walker Says No to Early Release, JSONLINE (Feb. 19, 2009), 
http://www.jsonline.com/blogs/news/39858997.html. 
58. See WIS. LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, ACT MEMO: 2011 WISCONSIN ACT 38, REPEAL OF 
EARLY RELEASE, http://legis.wisconsin.gov/lc/publications/act/2011/act038-sb057.pdf 
(summarizing the effect of the legislation on early release).  See generally Part II.C. 
59. Wisconsin also has common law forms of sentence modification, but these are not 
relevant to this Article’s analysis of earned release mechanisms.  I analyze these doctrines in 
another article.  Jesse J. Norris, Should States Expand Judicial Sentence Modification? A 
Cautionary Tale, 35 HAMLINE L. REV. 101, 115–32 (2012). 
60. WIS. LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, supra note 58, at 1. 
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1. Parole Release  
For inmates who committed offenses before December 31, 1999, the 
Parole Commission retains the discretionary authority to release them 
earlier than their release date.61  However, over the last two decades the 
Parole Commission has become increasingly reluctant to release inmates 
to community supervision, and has thus released a larger share of 
inmates near or on their mandatory release dates.62  Previously, the 
Commission released inmates after serving, on average, 50% of their 
sentences.63 
The 2009 sentencing reforms changed the name of the Parole 
Commission to the ERRC, but the 2011 measures restored its original 
name.64  From 2009 to 2011, the ERRC played a role in several other 
earned release mechanisms.65  As described below, the ERRC was the 
main decision-maker for ERRC release, compassionate release, and two 
of the three forms of positive adjustment time.  It remains to be seen 
whether, in line with the state’s general policy at that time of facilitating 
earned release, the ERRC granted eligible inmates parole earlier than 
the Parole Commission. 
2. Compassionate Release 
TIS-II legislation also created an earned release mechanism 
applicable to inmates of advanced age or with less than six months to 
live.  TIS-III significantly broadened these provisions, dropping the 
requirement of a terminal condition.66  The term “compassionate 
 
61. WIS. STAT. § 304.06 (2009–2010). 
62. Interview with Walter J. Dickey, George H. Young Chair, Univ. of Wis. Law Sch., 
Former Sec’y, Wis. Dep’t of Corr. (Apr. 10, 2009); see also State v. Wood, 2007 WI App 190, 
¶ 3, 305 Wis. 2d 133, 738 N.W.2d 81 (quoting a 1994 letter from Governor Tommy Thompson 
to the Department of Corrections secretary urging the department “to pursue any and all 
available legal avenues to block the release of violent offenders who have reached their 
mandatory release date”).  The mandatory release date occurred after the inmate has served 
two-thirds of the prison sentence.  See supra note 42 and accompanying text. 
63. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.  “The percentage of the prison sentence 
served was somewhat higher for shorter sentences, and significantly lower for extremely long 
sentences, but the overall average was fifty percent.”  Interview with Walter J. Dickey, supra 
note 62. 
64. 2009 Wis. Act 28, § 25 (amending WIS. STAT. § 15.02 (2007–2008) to change the 
name of the Parole Commission to the Earned Release Review Commission); 2011 Wis. Act 
38, § 1 (amending WIS. STAT. § 15.02 (2009–2010) to change the name of the Earned Release 
Review Commission to the Parole Commission).  
65. See WIS. STAT. § 304.06 (2009–2010). 
66. WIS. STAT. § 302.113(9g) (2007–2008).  Inmates in prison for a class B felony were 
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release” in Wisconsin has traditionally referred to a DOC procedure for 
granting parole for health reasons, which is still applicable to non-TIS 
inmates.67  This Article uses the term “compassionate release” for the 
earned release mechanism applying to TIS inmates because it has 
become a nationally recognized generic term for statutes allowing 
earned release for age or health reasons. 
Under the TIS-II statute, known as geriatric/terminal release, an 
inmate who had less than six months to live, or who was either over 
sixty-five years old and had served over five years of the prison 
sentence, or over sixty years old and had served over ten years, could 
apply to the prison’s Program Review Committee for earned release.68  
If the Committee determined the inmate’s release to be in the public 
interest, the inmate could petition the sentencing judge to grant the 
release.69  This statute is no longer applicable because the TIS-III 
legislation replaced it with a similar but more permissive earned release 
mechanism, which was available to all TIS inmates.70 
 
ineligible.  Id.  See generally Gregory J. O’Meara, Compassion and the Public Interest: 
Wisconsin’s New Compassionate Release Legislation, 23 FED. SENT’G REP. 33, 33–34 (2010).  
For discussions of age- and health-related releases generally, see TINA CHIU, VERA 
INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, IT’S ABOUT TIME: AGING PRISONERS, INCREASING COSTS, AND 
GERIATRIC RELEASE (2010); John A. Beck, Compassionate Release from New York State 
Prisons: Why Are So Few Getting Out?, 27 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 216 (1999) (discussing New 
York’s deficiencies in its compassionate release and suggesting change); Berry III, supra note 
7; Nadine Curran, Blue Hairs in the Bighouse: The Rise in Elderly Inmate Population, Its 
Effect on the Overcrowding Dilemma and Solutions to Correct It, 26 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & 
CIV. CONFINEMENT 225 (2000); Timothy Curtin, The Continuing Problem of America’s Aging 
Prison Population and the Search for a Cost-Effective and Socially Acceptable Means of 
Addressing It, 15 ELDER L.J. 473 (2007); Jason S. Ornduff, Releasing the Elderly Inmate: A 
Solution to Prison Overcrowding, 4 ELDER L.J. 173 (1996) (considering various ways to 
handle aging inmates); Marjorie P. Russell, Too Little, Too Late, Too Slow: Compassionate 
Release of Terminally Ill Prisoners—Is the Cure Worse Than the Disease?, 3 WIDENER J. PUB. 
L. 799, 818–32 (1994) (surveying compassionate release statutes across the United States). 
67. Wis. Dep’t Corr., Div. of Adult Insts., Extraordinary Circumstances/Compassionate 
Release, Department of Corrections Internal Management Procedure (Apr. 1, 2012).  It 
allows release because of “[a]dvanced age, infirmity or disability of the inmate, need for 
treatment or services not available within a correctional institution, a sentence to a term of 
imprisonment that is substantially disparate from the sentence usually imposed for a 
particular offense, or other circumstances warranting an earned release.”  Id. 
68. WIS. STAT. § 302.1135 (2009–2010), repealed by 2011 Wis. Act 38, § 47.  Terminally 
ill inmates had to obtain affidavits from two physicians diagnosing a terminal condition.  Id.  
The inmate needed to have had less than six months to live, even with “life-sustaining 
treatment provided in accordance with the prevailing standard of medical care.”  Id. 
69. Id. 
70. Id.; see also 2011 Wis. Act 38, § 47. 
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The TIS-III legislation removed the judicial role in the release 
decision, retained the age and length of sentence provisions, and 
required an “extraordinarily health condition” rather than a terminal 
condition for applicants not meeting the age and length of sentence 
requirements.71  An extraordinary health condition can include any 
condition, including “advanced age, infirmity, or disability of the person 
or a need for medical treatment or services not available within a 
correctional institution.”72 
To apply for compassionate release from 2009 to 2011, an inmate 
submitted a petition to the ERRC.  If the applicant did not meet the age 
and length of sentence requirements, he or she had to provide affidavits 
from two physicians documenting the extraordinary health condition.73  
If the ERRC rejected the petition, the inmate could appeal to a court, 
which would review the decision under the deferential abuse of 
discretion standard, and the inmate could not apply again until a year 
later.74 
The 2011 legislation altered the procedure slightly but retained the 
provision allowing for compassionate release because of an 
extraordinary health condition.  Instead of applying to the ERRC, the 
inmate applies to the prison’s Program Review Committee.75  The 
Committee may reject the petition if it determines that the release 
would not be in the public interest.76  If the Committee believes the 
release would be in the public interest, the court holds a mandatory 
hearing.77  If the inmate proves “by the greater weight of the credible 
evidence” that his or her release would be in the public interest, the 
court must release the inmate.78 
 
71. Id.; 2011 Wis. Act 38, § 45. 
72. 2011 Wis. Act 38, § 45. 
73. Id. § 302.1135(3), repealed by 2011 Wis. Act 38, § 47. 
74. Id. § 302.1135(8), (9), repealed by 2011 Wis. Act 38, § 47.  Indigent inmates pursuing 
compassionate release may be represented by a public defender, though the State Public 
Defender has the power to decide whether to represent the inmate.  Id. § 302.1135(10), 
repealed by 2011 Wis. Act 38, § 47.  This is also the case under the current law.  WIS. STAT. 
§ 302.113(9g)(j) (2009–2010). 
75. 2011 Wis. Act 38, § 45 (creating WIS. STAT. § 302.113(9g)(c)). 
76. Id. (creating WIS. STAT. § 302.113(9g)(cm)). 
77. Id. (creating WIS. STAT. § 302.113(9g)(d)). 
78. Id. (creating WIS. STAT. § 302.113(9g)(e)). 
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3. Program-Based Release 
Program-based release mechanisms are another method of sentence 
reduction arising from TIS-II legislation.  Completing either the Earned 
Release Program (ERP) or Challenge Incarceration Program (CIP) 
entitles inmates release to parole or extended supervision.79  For TIS 
inmates to take advantage of these programs, the judge must declare the 
offender eligible at sentencing.80  The ERP, originally a residential drug 
treatment program,81 was temporarily expanded by TIS-III legislation to 
apply to those without drug treatment needs.82  The Challenge 
Incarceration Program (CIP), created in 1990, is a rigorous “boot camp” 
program, which was also originally designed for drug treatment but was 
broadened by TIS-III legislation.83  The 2011 (TIS-IV) legislation 
reversed these changes, changing the name from Earned Release 
Program to “Wisconsin substance abuse program,” and restricting CIP 
to offenders with substance abuse problems.84 
 
79. WIS. STAT. § 302.045(3m) (2009–2010); WIS. STAT. § 302.05(3)(c) (2009–2010), 
amended by 2011 Wis. Act 38, §§ 19, 26–27.  For TIS inmates, the remainder of the prison 
term is added to the inmate’s extended supervision.  WIS. STAT. § 302.045(3m) (2009–2010); 
WIS. STAT. § 302.05(3)(c) (2009–2010), amended by 2011 Wis. Act 38, §§ 19, 26–27. 
80. WIS. STAT. § 302.045(2)(cm) (2009–2010); WIS. STAT. § 302.05(3)(a)(2) (2009–2010); 
WIS. STAT. § 302.05(3)(c)(2) (2007–2008), amended by 2011 Wis. Act 38, § 27; see also Ross, 
supra note 42, at 7.  TIS-I inmates—who were sentenced before ERP existed—can, with the 
Department’s approval, petition the judge to declare them eligible for ERP.  Initially, the 
Department’s policy was not to allow TIS-I inmates to petition the judge, but after State v. 
Johnson, the Department now allows TIS-I inmates to do so, once they have demonstrated 
they are statutorily eligible.  State v. Johnson, 2007 WI App 41, ¶ 17; 299 Wis. 2d. 785; 730 
N.W.2d. 661; see also Memorandum from Office of the Public Defender, Earned Release 
Program 4-40–41 (2007), available at http://www.wisspd.org/htm/ATPracGuides/SER/ERP 
.pdf. 
81. WIS. STAT. § 302.05 (2009–2010), amended by 2011 Wis. Act 38, § 19 (changing the 
name from the “Earned Release Program” to the “Substance Abuse Program”); Tony 
Streveler, Earned Release Program: An Overview of the Eligibility Criteria and Program, WIS. 
DEFENDER, Fall 2003, at 4, 6 (2003). 
82. The change was from “Substance abuse program” to “Earned release program” in 
the 2009 Act and then back to “Substance abuse program” in the 2011 Act.  See 2011 Wis. Act 
38, § 16 (amending 2009 Wis. Act 28, §§ 2703–04 (amending WIS. STAT. § 302.045(2) (2009–
2010))). 
83. WIS. STAT. § 302.045(2) (providing that the program is available to those with drug 
treatment needs or other treatment needs related to their criminal offense); Timothy A. 
Nelson, Challenge Incarceration Program: An Overview, WIS. DEFENDER, Fall 2003, at 16, 
16–17 (noting the previous requirement that inmates have a substance abuse treatment need). 
84. WIS. STAT. § 302.05(1)(am) (2009–2010); id. § 302.045(2)(d). 
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4. Sentence Adjustment 
The TIS-II reforms included “sentence adjustment,” a statutory 
earned release mechanism that went into effect in 2003.85  With the 
exception of offenders convicted of the most serious crimes, all TIS 
inmates can apply to the sentencing court for sentence adjustment after 
serving 75% or 85% (depending on the offense classification) of their 
prison sentences, regardless of when their offenses occurred.86  In 
response to an inmate’s timely sentence adjustment petition, the 
sentencing judge may order the inmate’s earned release.87  The time the 
judge removes from the prison portion of the offender’s sentence shifts 
to the extended supervision portion, so that the overall length of the 
bifurcated sentence remains the same.88  The statute permits judges to 
grant sentence adjustments if the inmate has made significant 
rehabilitative or educational progress, if the penalties for the offense 
have been lowered, if the inmate is subject to a sentence in another 
jurisdiction, if the inmate is an illegal immigrant who will be deported 
upon release, or if the adjustment would be “otherwise in the interests 
of justice.”89  The 2009 TIS-III legislation phased out sentence 
adjustment, making it unavailable for inmates who committed crimes 
after October 1, 2009 (TIS-III inmates).90  However, the 2011 legislation 
restored sentence adjustment in its original form.91 
 
85. WIS. STAT. § 973.195 (2007–2008).  Inmates with the offense classification A or B, 
which together covered most violent crimes, could not apply for sentence adjustment.  Id. 
86. Id.; State v. Tucker, 2005 WI 46, ¶¶ 2, 23, 279 Wis. 2d 697, 694 N.W.2d 926; State v. 
Trujillo, 2005 WI 45, ¶¶ 25, 30, 279 Wis. 2d 712, 694 N.W.2d 933. 
87. WIS. STAT. § 973.195 (2009–2010).  TIS-I inmates use the TIS-II offense 
classifications for the purpose of determining when they can apply for sentence adjustment.  
Tucker, 2005 WI 46, ¶ 23. 
88. WIS. STAT. § 973.195(1r)(g). 
89. Id. § 973.195(1r)(b).  Under the language of the statute, the district attorney or 
victim can veto the sentence adjustment, but the Supreme Court of Wisconsin ruled that the 
DA’s ability to block sentence adjustment is unconstitutional because it violates the state’s 
separation of powers doctrine.  State v. Stenklyft, 2005 WI 71, ¶ 105, 281 Wis. 2d 484, 697 
N.W.2d 769 (Abrahamson, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  Judges can thus 
take into account the district attorney’s objection to granting the petition, but the ultimate 
decision is for the judge.  Id. ¶ 82.  Courts have not ruled on whether the victim veto is 
unconstitutional. 
90. WIS. STAT. § 973.195(1r)(a) (2009–2010) (providing that inmates could only petition 
a court for sentence adjustment for sentences imposed before October 1, 2009). 
91. 2011 Wis. Act 38, § 94 (removing the provision phasing out judicial sentence 
adjustment in WIS. STAT. § 973.195(1r) (2009–2010)). 
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5. Earned Release from Probation 
From 2009 to 2011, the DOC could grant an early discharge once an 
offender on probation had served 50% of the probation sentence.92  The 
legislation originally provided that the sentencing court could grant 
earned release from probation when certain criteria were met, but 
Governor Doyle used his line-item veto powers to eliminate these 
provisions.93  Consequently, the DOC had full discretion whether to 
grant the earned release, with no requirement to notify or gain approval 
from a judge.94  The 2011 legislation changed the procedure so that the 
court, not the DOC, makes the final decision about whether to 
discharge the offender’s probation.95 
6. ERRC Release   
What this Article refers to as ERRC release is essentially a non-
judicial version of sentence adjustment, created by the 2009 legislation 
but abolished in 2011.  Between 2009 and 2011, TIS-I and TIS-II inmates 
could choose to petition the ERRC for release after serving 75% or 
85% of their sentences, instead of petitioning the sentencing court as in 
sentence adjustment.96  If the inmate had previously petitioned the court 
for sentence adjustment for any of the sentences for which the inmate is 
incarcerated, the inmate was ineligible to petition for ERRC release 
through this mechanism for any sentence currently being served.97  
ERRC release at 75% was available to inmates who committed their 
offense before October 1, 2009, and who were convicted of 
misdemeanors or class F through I felonies.98  ERRC release at 85% was 
available to inmates who committed offenses before the same date and 
 
92. 2009 Wis. Act 28, § 3392d (creating WIS. STAT. § 973.09(3)(d) (2009–2010)).  The 
legislation also amended a statute to allow discharge from parole or probation to enable the 
offender to enroll in the armed forces.  2009 Wis. Act 28, § 2772 (amending WIS. STAT. 
§ 304.071). 
93. See 2009 Wis. Act 28, § 3392d. 
94. See id. 
95. 2011 Wis. Act 38, § 93b (amending WIS. STAT. § 973.09(3)(d) (2009–2010)). 
96. WIS. STAT § 304.06(1)(bg)(3) (2009–2010) (allowing inmates whose crimes were 
committed earlier than October 1, 2009, to petition the ERRC for release after serving 75% 
of their sentence); id. § 304.06(1)(bg)(4) (allowing inmates whose crimes were committed 
earlier than October 1, 2009, to petition the ERRC for release after serving 85% of their 
sentence). 
97. Id. § 304.06(1)(bg)(3)–(4). 
98. Id. § 304.06(1)(bg)(3). 
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who were convicted of class C to E felonies.99  The ERRC had complete 
discretion whether to approve release, based on essentially the same 
criteria listed above for sentence adjustment.100  The ERRC had to 
notify the sentencing court of its intention to release an inmate through 
this mechanism, and the court could veto the release if it held a hearing 
on the matter within sixty days of being notified of the inmate’s planned 
release.101 
7. Positive Adjustment Time 
From 2009 to 2011, positive adjustment time (PAT) allowed inmates 
with good behavior to shorten their sentences by 33%, 25%, or 15%, 
depending on their offense of conviction.102  Inmates convicted of certain 
offenses, ranging from offenses against vulnerable people to “offenses 
related to ethical government,” were ineligible for PAT release.103  
“Track A” PAT (PAT-A), which was run by the DOC rather than the 
ERRC, allowed offenders convicted of  non-violent misdemeanors or 
non-violent class F to I felonies to be released after serving 67% of their 
sentences (or one day off for each two days of good behavior).104  Under 
“Track B” PAT (PAT-B) and “Track C” PAT (PAT-C), the ERRC 
could release an inmate who had served 75% or 85% of his or her 
sentence, respectively.105  PAT-B applied to offenders convicted of non-
violent misdemeanors or class F to I felonies, including those classified 
as violent offenses.106  PAT-C applied to offenders convicted of class C 
to E felonies.107 
 
99. Id. § 304.06(1)(bg)(4).  The only difference is that the provision allowing release 
because of changed sentencing policies was removed. 
100. Id. § 304.06(1)(bn). 
101. Id. § 304.06(1)(bk)(2). 
102. See WIS. STAT. § 302.113(2)(b) (2009–2010), repealed by 2011 Wis. Act 38, § 38; 
WIS. STAT. § 304.06(1)(bg)(1), (2) (2009–2010), repealed by 2011 Wis. Act 38, § 58. 
103. WIS. STAT. § 302.113(2)(b) (2009–2010), repealed by 2011 Wis. Act 38, § 38; WIS. 
STAT. § 304.06(bg)(1), repealed by 2011 Wis. Act 38, § 58. 
104. WIS. STAT. § 302.113(2)(b) (2009–2010), repealed by 2011 Wis. Act 38, § 38.  The 
use of the term “shall” in this provision may have led to the impression that earned release is 
mandatory if the inmate has earned time through PAT-A, but the department interpreted it 
as discretionary.  E-mail from Anthony Streveler, Wis. Dep’t of Corr., to author (Jan. 18, 
2011). 
105. WIS. STAT. § 304.06(1)(bg)(1)–(2) (2009–2010), repealed by 2011 Wis. Act 38, § 58.  
This amounted to one day off for every three days of good behavior for PAT-B or one day off 
for every 5.7 days of good behavior for PAT-C. 
106. Id. 
107. Id.  Violent offenders may qualify for PAT-C, provided their offense was not 
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Because inmates only began accruing PAT after October 1, 2009, 
PAT may have reduced the confinement sentences of many inmates 
only slightly.108  Certain types of disciplinary infractions could reduce the 
amount of PAT that inmates accumulate.109  For all three types of PAT 
release, the judge could veto the release, but only after holding a 
hearing.110 
Although the 2011 measures abolished PAT beginning on August 3, 
2011, inmates who had accrued PAT between October 1, 2009, and 
August 3, 2011, can still achieve reductions in their sentences.111  To do 
so, the inmate petitions the court, which may either reject the petition 
without a hearing or release the inmate after holding a hearing.112 
8. Risk Reduction Sentence 
In force from 2009 to 2011, the risk reduction sentence permitted 
inmates, excluding those convicted of certain offenses, to be released by 
the DOC after serving 75% of the sentence.113  As with program-based 
mechanisms, the judge had to declare the inmate eligible for a risk 
reduction sentence at sentencing.114  To be sentenced to a risk reduction 
sentence, inmates had to agree to be evaluated for their “criminogenic 
factors” and to participate in programming or treatment.115  The DOC 
was required to prepare a treatment plan for the inmate based on his or 
her risk of reoffending, and the inmate had to complete the treatment 
 
committed against a vulnerable person or otherwise excluded under the statute.  Id. 
108. Interview with Meredith Ross, Dir., Frank J. Remington Ctr., Univ. of Wis. Law 
Sch. (Feb. 16, 2010). 
109. The language of the statutes specifies that inmates can earn a day of PAT after 
serving a certain number of days in which “he or she does not violate any regulation of the 
prison or does not refuse or neglect to perform required or assigned duties.”  WIS. STAT. 
§ 304.06(1)(bg)(1)–(2); id. § 302.113(2)(b).  The DOC will likely interpret this to mean that 
major conduct reports, but not minor infractions, prevent inmates from earning PAT.  
Interview with Meredith Ross, supra note 108. 
110. WIS. STAT. § 304.06(1)(bk) (2009–2010), repealed by 2011 Wis. Act 38, § 59. 
111. 2011 Wis. Act 38, § 96 (creating WIS. STAT. § 973.198(1), which deals with sentence 
adjustment and positive adjustment time for inmates sentenced between October 1, 2009, and 
August 3, 2011). 
112. 2011 Wis. Act 38, § 96 (creating § 973.198(3), which outlines the hearing to be held 
by the sentencing court). 
113. WIS. STAT. § 973.031 (2009–2010), repealed by 2011 Wis. Act 38, § 92; WIS. STAT. 
§ 302.042 (2009–2010), repealed by 2011 Wis. Act 38, § 13. 
114. WIS. STAT. § 973.031 (2009–2010), repealed by 2011 Wis. Act 38, § 92. 
115. Id. 
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plan before release.116  Unique among the new earned release 
mechanisms, when the DOC released an inmate under the risk 
reduction sentence, the extended supervision portion of the sentence 
was not lengthened by the amount of incarceration that the inmate did 
not serve.117  That is, earned release through a risk reduction sentence 
shortened the overall length of the bifurcated sentence. 
The 2011 measures repealed the legislation authorizing risk 
reduction sentences.  However, offenders sentenced to risk reduction 
sentences under the previous law may still achieve release after serving 
75% of their sentences, if the DOC determines that the treatment plan 
was successfully completed and the inmate maintained a good behavior 
record.118 
9. Certain Early Release 
“Certain early release,” which was created in 2009 and repealed in 
2011, took its name from the statute’s reference to “certain persons” 
eligible for release.119  Under certain early release, the DOC could 
release eligible inmates within a year of their original release date, if 
approved by the Secretary of Corrections and either the inmate’s prison 
social worker or the inmate’s community corrections agent.120  Only 
inmates serving sentences for misdemeanors or nonviolent class F 
through I felonies were eligible.121  The prison social worker or 
community corrections agent was required to have “reason to believe” 
that the inmate would not engage in “assaultive activity” in the 
community.122  The statute did not clarify how they were to make such a 
determination.  After this prerequisite was met, the Secretary of 
Corrections made the final decision whether to release the inmate.123  
Governor Doyle vetoed a provision in the legislation that would have 
 
116. WIS. STAT. § 302.042 (2009–2010), repealed by 2011 Wis. Act 38, § 13. 
117. Interview with Meredith Ross, supra note 108. 
118. 2011 Wis. Act 38, § 14m (creating WIS. STAT. § 302.043, outlining the procedure for 
inmates currently serving risk reduction sentences to be released under the terms of the prior 
risk reduction sentence system). 
119. WIS. STAT. § 302.113(9h) (2009–2010), repealed by 2011 Wis. Act 38, § 46.  
Subsection 9(h) was repealed in its entirety. 
120. Id. 
121. Id. § 302.113(9h)(c)(1). 
122. Id. § 302.113(9h)(c)(2). 
123. Id. § 302.113(9h); WIS. ADMIN. CODE DOC § 302.41 (current through 659 Wis. 
Admin. Reg. (Nov. 1, 2010)). 
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allowed a court to veto the release decision.124  The 2011 legislation 
completely abolished certain early release.125 
10. Earned Release from Extended Supervision 
The 2009 TIS-III legislation authorized the DOC to reduce 
community supervision sentences, including extended supervision and 
probation sentences.126  From 2009 to 2011, once an offender had served 
a minimum of two years of extended supervision while meeting the 
conditions of supervision, the DOC could discharge the offender early 
from the supervision sentence.127  Before doing so, the DOC had to 
determine that the discharge would be in the interests of justice and 
provide notice to the victim of the intention to grant the discharge.128  
The 2011 legislation eliminated this form of earned release.129 
D.  Shifts in Decision-Making Authority 
Under TIS-II, all the statutory earned release mechanisms available 
to TIS inmates required approval by a judge, either at sentencing or 
when the inmate requested earned release.130  That changed under TIS-
III, which placed a large amount of the decision-making responsibility 
with the ERRC and DOC.  The judge had to pre-approve Risk 
 
124. See 2009 Wis. Act 28, § 2739 (creating WIS. STAT. § 302.113(9h) (2009–2010)); 
Governor Jim Doyle, Veto Message 3 (Jun. 29, 2009), available at 
http://www.doa.state.wi.us/debf/pdf_files/2009-11VetoMessage.pdf. 
125. See 2011 Wis. Act 38, § 46. 
126. TIS-II legislation included a provision allowing inmates to petition a court to 
change the conditions of their extended supervision sentences, within one year before their 
release to extended supervision, or after they have served one year of their supervision 
sentences.  WIS. STAT. § 302.113(7m)(e) (2007–2008).  This relates not to the length of 
extended supervision, but to the rules the offenders are required to follow as a condition of 
their extended supervision sentence.  This is a form of sentence modification, since it changes 
the substance of the sentence, but it is not a form of earned release, since it does not change 
the duration of supervision. 
127. WIS. STAT. § 973.01(4m) (2009–2010), repealed by 2011 Wis. Act 38, § 90. 
128. Id. 
129. 2011 Wis. Act 38, § 91 (amending WIS. STAT. § 973.01(7) (2009–2010) to prohibit 
the department of corrections from discharging the defendant from any custody or 
supervision until the entire sentence has been served). 
130. The only forms of earned release available during that time for TIS inmates were 
program-based mechanisms and sentence adjustment.  For program-based mechanisms, the 
judge decides at sentencing whether the defendant is eligible to participate in these programs.  
See supra note 92 and accompanying text.  Through sentence adjustment, the judge has the 
discretion to release the inmate before the offender has served the maximum incarceration 
sentence.  See supra notes 58–72 and accompanying text. 
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Reduction Sentences and program-based mechanisms, and judges could 
veto PAT release and ERRC release after holding a hearing.131  The 
judge had no role, however, in certain early release, compassionate 
release, or earned discharge from community supervision, or in the final 
decision to release inmates after serving a Risk Reduction Sentence or 
completing the ERP or CIP programs.132  The 2011 legislation (which 
could be called TIS-IV) reversed this trend, placing most of the earned 
release authority in judges.133  Under the current system of earned 
release—with the exception of pre-truth-in-sentencing inmates eligible 
for parole—the judge either initially declares the defendant eligible for 
an earned release program (as in Wisconsin’s substance abuse program 
or Challenge Incarceration Program) or makes the final decision 
whether to approve an offender’s release from prison or probation.134 
III.  DESIGNING AND IMPLEMENTING EARNED RELEASE: LESSONS 
FROM WISCONSIN AND GENERAL PRINCIPLES FOR STATE-LEVEL 
STRATEGIES 
This Part first evaluates Wisconsin’s new earned release statutes, and 
then identifies general principles for successful implementation of 
earned release mechanisms, drawing in part on the lessons from 
Wisconsin’s experiences.  In 2009, Wisconsin multiplied the number of 
earned release mechanisms, creating potential confusion and interaction 
problems.135  Furthermore, the mechanisms were implemented in an 
uneven manner, and it seemed unclear whether the state would provide 
the additional resources necessary to implement the mechanisms 
successfully.  On the other hand, the reduction of the judicial role in 
earned release, the significant broadening of compassionate release, and 
the careful attention paid to public safety, suggest that the 2009 earned 
release mechanisms could have been applied consistently and could 
have resulted in significant cost savings without increasing risks to the 
public.136  However, the 2011 legislation returned nearly all earned 
 
131. See supra notes 77, 104, 110 and accoumpanying text. 
132. See supra notes 96, 114, 120, 121, 129 and accompanying text; WIS. STAT. 
§ 302.042(4) (2009–2010), repealed by 2011 Wis. Act 38 § 13. 
133. See WIS. LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, supra note 59, at 2 (“The Act moves the 
authority to discharge from the department to the court . . . .”); Part II.C. 
134. See supra notes 89–91, 98, and 130. 
135. See 2009 Wis. Act 29, §§ 2703–2712 (amending WIS. STAT. § 302.05 (2009–2010) to 
be the “earned release program,” which later was amended by 2011 Wis. Act 38). 
136. See infra Parts III.A.1–.3. 
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release power to judges, increasing the risk of geographic and racial 
disparities.137  In support of my argument that administrative officials 
and not judges should have most of the responsibility for earned release, 
I present preliminary data indicating dramatic geographic disparities in 
the application of a judicial earned release mechanism, which may have 
reinforced racial disparities. 
Second, influenced by both Wisconsin’s experience and previous 
scholarship, this Article proposes four principles for the successful 
implementation of earned release legislation.  States experimenting with 
earned release should (1) provide for measurements and internal 
controls to prevent injustice or disparity in earned release decisions; (2) 
structure earned release decisions to avoid increasing risks to public 
safety; (3) employ strategic governance to ensure that earned release 
mechanisms actually manage to release a substantial number of inmates; 
and (4) complement earned release with other measures meant to 
reduce incarceration.  As part of this discussion, I respond to the 
concerns of Professor Harcourt by using initial data to show that the 
expanded earned release mechanisms in effect from 2009 to 2011 did not 
exacerbate racial disparities and that earned release was responsible for 
a small, though non-trivial percentage of total releases.  Finally, this Part 
concludes by briefly discussing ways in which the Article’s proposals 
may contribute in a new way toward the development of a “rule-of-law 
sentencing” approach. 
A.  Evaluating Wisconsin’s Earned Release Mechanisms 
1. Reducing the Judicial Role in Earned Release Decisions 
The respective roles of administrative officials and judges in earned 
release have varied widely over the last decade and a half.  Before truth-
in-sentencing, parole officials had nearly all the power over earned 
release.  From 2001 to 2009, judges had most of the earned release 
authority, but the 2009 reforms gave a much larger share of the decision-
making power to administrative officials.138  The 2011 legislation 
reversed these changes, vesting virtually all significant power over 
 
137. 2011 Wis. Act 38, § 37 (amending WIS. STAT. § 302.113(2) (2009–2010)). 
138. See, e.g., 2009 Wis. Act 29, § 2702 (amending WIS. STAT. § 302.045(3) (2009–2010)), 
explaining that the ERRC would determine an inmate’s eligibility for parole).  
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earned release in judges.139  This Part argues that it is preferable for 
judges to play, at most, a minor role in earned release decisions. 
This Part supports this normative claim in two ways.  First, it argues 
that state actors are, on the whole, better positioned than judges to 
make earned release decisions.  Second, it demonstrates that in practice, 
judge-centered earned release (sentence adjustment under TIS-II) 
resulted in vast geographic disparities, which may have reinforced racial 
inequality in sentencing.  However, more limited roles for judges in 
earned release, including the ability to veto earned release after a 
hearing or to shorten a sentence through common law mechanisms in 
certain circumstances,140 are potentially appropriate and useful 
components of earned release systems. 
State officials, such as those in the DOC and the Parole Commission, 
are arguably better equipped than judges to make earned release 
decisions.  State actors have comprehensive, intimate knowledge of the 
inmate’s behavior and attitudes while the inmates are incarcerated; are 
more qualified than judges to use scientifically validated risk assessment 
procedures to determine which offenders are at the highest risk of re-
offending; and process enough cases to ascertain whether similar 
offenders have typically been released, allowing them to achieve some 
measure of consistency.141  In addition, when centralized administrative 
actors make release decisions based on the relative risk of different 
offenders, prisoners develop incentives to avoid disciplinary infractions 
and complete rehabilitative programs, thus decreasing recidivism after 
these offenders are released.142  If judges in some areas rarely grant 
 
139. See, e.g., 2011 Wis. Act 38, § 45 (creating WIS. STAT. § 302.113(9g) and giving the 
court the authority to review the department’s determination that an inmate is eligible for 
release due to an extraordinary health condition and to hold a hearing to determine if release 
is in the public interest); 2011 Wis. Act 38, § 93b (amending WIS. STAT. § 973.08(3)(d)(intro.) 
(2009–2010) and giving the sentencing court the sole authority to discharge someone from 
probation early). 
140. See infra Part II.D; Norris, supra note 60, at 132–34. 
141. See David S. Abrams et al., Do Judges Vary in Their Treatment of Race?, J. LEGAL 
STUD. (forthcoming 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 
1800840 (using statistical analysis to demonstrate that judges vary significantly in whether 
they send minority offenders to prison rather than probation); see also Ilyana Kuziemko, 
Should Prison Inmates Be Released via Rules or Discretion?, Q.J. ECON. (forthcoming 2012) 
(manuscript at 11) (“[I]f some of the disparities in punishment are due to statistical 
discrimination, then because parole boards have substantially more information than do 
earlier actors, they may be less prone to discrimination.”). 
142. For example, using parole data from Georgia, Kuziemko shows that abolishing 
parole led inmates to commit more infractions, complete less programming, and recidivate at 
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earned release, making earned release more unpredictable, these 
incentives may not be clear enough to positively influence inmate 
behavior. 
On the other hand, Professor Klingele argues that judicial sentence 
modification is more transparent, politically sustainable, and 
accountability-enhancing, given that judges are knowledgeable about 
local conditions, accountable to the local electorate, and obligated to 
explain their decisions in open court.143  While there is merit to this 
argument, in practice judges may not have the detailed knowledge of 
local conditions needed to make superior earned release decisions.  
Moreover, the fact that judges are elected may make them unwilling to 
approve even meritorious releases, because of their fear of being 
branded “soft on crime” by political opponents.144 
Another reason to give state officials most of the responsibility for 
earned release is that, on an aggregate level, state officials are likely to 
grant earned release in a more consistent manner than judges, avoiding 
racial and geographic disparities.  Available data indicates that 
Wisconsin’s judge-centered earned release system under TIS-II—
specifically, the mechanism known as sentence adjustment—resulted in 
 
a higher rate after release.  Kuziemko, supra note 142 (manuscript at 30); see also JOAN 
PETERSILIA, WHEN PRISONERS COME HOME: PAROLE AND PRISONER REENTRY 70–71 
(2003) (reviewing evidence that parole may increase public safety). 
143. Klingele, Changing the Sentence, supra note 8, at 514–20. 
144. Indeed, the release of an offender became an issue in a recent Wisconsin Supreme 
Court election.  See Robert L. Brown, Toxic Judicial Elections: A Proposed Remedy, ARK. 
LAW., Fall 2009, at 12, 13 (describing an “egregious and offensive” advertisement by Justice 
Michael Gableman, which suggested falsely that his opponent, Justice Louis B. Butler, Jr., 
had found a loophole that allowed a child molester to be released and commit additional 
offenses); see also In re Judicial Disciplinary Proceedings Against Gableman, 2010 WI 62, 
¶ 63, 325 Wis. 2d 631, 784 N.W.2d 631 (split decision in which three justices concluded that 
Justice Gableman’s ad, while “distasteful,”  had not violated Supreme Court Rule 60.06(3)(c), 
while the other three participating justices concluded that the ad did violate the rule).  For 
discussions of the way that the “tough-on-crime” mentality—and a desire not to appear 
“soft”—can affect how elected judges judge, see Keith Swisher, Pro-Prosecution Judges: 
“Tough on Crime,” Soft on Strategy, and Ripe for Disqualification, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 317 
(2010) (proposing that judges who run on “tough on crime” platforms to win elections have 
effectively made themselves impartial and biased and should thus recuse themselves from all 
criminal cases); and Joanna Cohn Weiss, Note, Tough on Crime: How Campaigns for State 
Judiciary Violate Criminal Defendants’ Due Process Rights, 81 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1101 (2006) 
(examining how the media affects a judge’s impetus to appear—or be—“tough on crime” and 
proposing that states should adopt recusal measures to protect defendants from due process 
violations due to impartiality). 
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enormous geographic disparities, which may have worsened the state’s 
already abysmal racial disparities.145 
In Racine and Kenosha Counties, which together account for 11.5% 
of the state’s African-American prison population, judges only 
approved about 1% of sentence adjustment petitions during 2005 and 
2006.146  Milwaukee County accounts for 67% of the state’s African-
American inmates.147  While this might understate the number of 
petitions granted, the only available data on Milwaukee County 
indicates an even lower approval rate (.3%).148  If the Milwaukee County 
data is accurate, or if Milwaukee County’s true rate is similar to that of 
Kenosha and Racine Counties, then as of 2007, about 79% of the state’s 
 
145. Id.; see infra Part III.B.2; infra notes 146–147. 
146. Wis. Dep’t of Corr., Racial Disparities Analysis (2007) (on file with author).  Sixty-
nine inmates sent petitions to Racine County Judges in 2005, but none were approved.  
William Rosales, Sentence Adjustment Petition Data (2007) (on file with author).  In 2006, 
three out of 117 were approved in Racine County.  Id.  In Kenosha County, there were 
twenty-one petitions in 2005 and five in 2006, but none were granted in either year.  Id.  
Dividing the number of petitions granted in the two counties (3) over the total number of 
petitions (212) yields an approval rate for both counties of 1.4% for 2005/2006. 
 The author derived the sentence adjustment petition approval statistics from a dataset 
created by attorney and sociologist William E. Rosales, who used raw data from the 
Consolidated Court Automation Programs.  Petitions for sentence modification are filed with 
the sentencing judge, so the county of conviction, not the county of actual imprisonment, is 
referred to in this discussion.  WIS. STAT. § 973.198(1). 
147. Wis. Dep’t of Corr., supra note 146; Rosales, supra note 146.  Only 1 out of 115 
petitions was granted in 2005, and none of the 153 petitions were granted in 2006. 
148. Rosales, supra note 146; see also William E. Rosales, Sentence Adjustment Petitions: 
An Update, WIS. DEFENDER, Winter/Spring 2007, at 1, 4 (indicating that, according to a court 
staff member, Milwaukee courts were unaware of the codes for sentence adjustment for an 
unspecified period).  It should be noted that the dataset includes data from 2002 through 
2006, though the 2002 through 2004 data was not analyzed in this Article, due to the low 
number of sentence adjustment petitions in that time period.  Although we do not know when 
the Milwaukee courts were allegedly unaware of the codes for sentence adjustments, it seems 
that they became aware of them by 2004, because more sentence adjustment petitions were 
recorded for 2004 than for 2005 and 2006.  Rosales, supra note 146.  It is possible that other 
counties had problems with data entry, but there is no evidence that this is the case.  In any 
event, even if the Milwaukee data understates the true approval rate, there are other reasons 
to believe that the Milwaukee approval rate was unusually low.  See LEGAL ASSISTANCE TO 
INSTITUTIONALIZED PERSONS PROJECT, § 973.195 SENTENCE ADJUSTMENT PRO SE 
PACKET: REVISED TO INCLUDE 2011 WISCONSIN ACT 38 CHANGES 7 (2012), available at 
http://law.wisc.edu/fjr/laip/sentence_adjustment_pkt_act_38_2012.pdf  (singling out 
Milwaukee County as having especially low rates of approval); LEGAL ASSISTANCE TO 
INSTITUTIONALIZED PERSONS PROJECT, SENTENCE ADJUSTMENT PRO SE PACKET 7 
(2005),  available  at  http://www.wisspd.org/htm/ATPracGuides/Training/ProgMaterials/Conf 
2005/Ross/SA.pdf (suggesting that Milwaukee judges in particular require certain kinds of 
proof before even considering adjustment petitions). 
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black prison population was convicted in counties in which the 
2005/2006 average approval rate was about 1%.149  By contrast, in the 67 
counties with few blacks sentenced to prison, judges approved on 
average 15% of sentence adjustment petitions.150  About 67% of the 
state’s white prison population was convicted in these counties, and 
about 77% of the state’s white prison population lives in those counties 
or in Dane or Rock County, which had higher approval rates than 
Milwaukee, Racine, and Kenosha.151 
If the 2005/2006 Milwaukee data is accurate, petitions filed by 
inmates convicted in overwhelmingly white, rural counties were over 
eighteen times more likely to be granted than those from the urban 
counties in which the vast majority of the state’s African-American 
prison population were sentenced.152  This would have likely reinforced 
the state’s racial disparities in imprisonment, by shortening sentences for 
inmates from overwhelmingly white counties but rarely if ever doing so 
for inmates from more diverse counties.  However, lacking individual-
level data, it is impossible to demonstrate with certainty that these 
geographic disparities would have impacted racial disparities.153  Even if 
 
149. This 79% figure was generated by adding the percentage of the state’s black prison 
population accounted for by Milwaukee, Racine, and Kenosha counties.  Wis. Dep’t of Corr., 
supra note 146.  The average approval rate was .8%.  This was calculated by dividing the 
number of granted requests in 2005 and 2006 in the three counties by the number of total 
requests.  Rosales, supra note 146. 
150. This figure was generated by calculating the overall approval rate of the 67 counties 
for 2005 and 2006, and averaging the two rates.  Consol. Ct. Automation Programs, supra 
note 146. 
151. One of the counties with a large African-American prison population, Dane 
County, which accounts for about 8% of the state’s black prison population, has a 2005/2006 
approval rate of 17%, slightly higher than the rate for predominantly white counties.  Wis. 
Dep’t of Corr., supra note 146; Consol. Ct. Automation Programs, supra note 146.  Rock 
County, which accounts for 2.7% of the state’s black prison population, had an unusually high 
2005/2006 approval rate, averaging 37%.  Wis. Dep’t of Corr., supra note 146; Consol. Ct. 
Automation Programs, supra note 146.  While this may indicate that African-Americans have 
a greater chance of achieving sentence adjustment in these counties, it should be noted that a 
large proportion of prison inmates from these counties (54% in Rock County and 45% in 
Dane County) are white.   
152. Dividing the average approval rate in the 67 overwhelmingly white counties (15%), 
by the average approval rate of Milwaukee, Racine, and Kenosha Counties together yields a 
ratio of 18.75 to one.  Rosales, supra note 146; see supra note 151 and accompanying text. 
153. This said, if the Milwaukee data is accurate, there would only be two ways that 
increased racial disparities could not result from these geographic disparities, and neither are 
real possibilities.  First, if most of the sentence modifications granted in overwhelmingly white 
counties were granted to black inmates, this could potentially lead to equitable results on the 
aggregate level.  Yet given the small proportion of black inmates convicted in those counties 
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Milwaukee is excluded, the data still demonstrate striking geographic 
disparities between counties, which could have potentially affected 
racial disparities.154 
These geographic disparities could be due mainly to the large 
workloads of urban courts, or they could result from a number of 
different factors.  Regardless, administrative decision-makers would 
most likely grant earned release with much less geographic disparity 
than judges, because these statewide actors would apply the same 
considerations and methodology to inmates regardless of location.  It is 
possible that due to the nature of the communities to which the inmates 
will be returning, or the types of offenses committed in different areas, 
the rate of earned release will vary somewhat among geographic areas.  
However, the wide disparities under judicial sentence adjustment would 
be highly unlikely to occur if state officials alone were in charge of 
earned release.155   
The more limited role of judges under TIS-III may be an example of 
an appropriate and useful role for judges in an earned release system.  
To review, during the TIS-II period from 2003 to 2009, trial court judges 
were the principal actors with discretionary power to reduce sentences.  
TIS-III reduced the judicial role considerably, allowing judges to veto 
earned release only for positive adjustment time releases and ERRC 
release, and then only if the judges hold a hearing within the time 
limit.156 
 
(usually less than 10% and sometimes less than 5%), this is extremely unlikely.  Dep’t of 
Corr., supra note 146.  Second, if the sentence modifications in Dane or Rock County were 
given to blacks at highly disproportionate rates, it is possible that this could at least partially 
prevent the geographic disparities from causing racial disparities, by compensating somewhat 
for the fact that 79% of the state’s black prison population was convicted in counties in which 
judges rarely if ever grant sentence modifications.  See supra note 150 and accompanying text.  
Yet since only Rock County (which accounts for just 2.7% of the black prison population) 
had a rate of approval that was significantly higher than average, such an effect cannot 
realistically be expected to erase or substantially reduce the overall racial disparity.   
154. As noted above, Dane County, which represents about 8% of the state’s black 
prison population, has an approval rate similar to that of the mainly white counties, and Rock 
County, where 2.7% of the state’s black inmates were convicted, had a higher approval rate.  
See supra note 151 and accompanying text.  Depending on how many of these sentence 
adjustments went to African-Americans, this might have had a balancing effect, preventing 
the low approval rates in Kenosha and Racine County from contributing to racial disparities. 
155. See supra notes 141–145 and accompanying text. 
156. Neither TIS-II nor TIS-III affected the power of courts, under three common law 
or constitutional doctrines, to reduce sentences in response to a motion. 
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In practice, this requirement may have discouraged judges from 
blocking earned release decisions, particularly for judges in populous 
urban areas with heavy caseloads.  On the other hand, there was a 
possibility that judges would hold perfunctory hearings that nearly 
always result in vetoing the earned release.  This does not seem to have 
occurred.  Data from the first year of the new earned release system 
show that courts declined to hold a hearing in 72% of cases.157  When a 
hearing was held, judges blocked the release 51% of the time.158  This 
relatively low rate of hearings probably indicates that judges trusted 
administrators to make sound release decisions. 
By giving power to both a parole-type commission (the ERRC) and 
judges, these two earned release mechanisms—PAT and ERRP 
release—represented a curious melding of the TIS-II judge-centered 
approach and the pre-TIS parole system.  The authors of the 2009 
reforms may have thought that preserving a role for judges was 
necessary to keep the “truth-in-sentencing” character of the system 
intact, but in fact most truth-in-sentencing states have never relied 
exclusively on judicial forms of earned release.159 
Alternatively, lawmakers may have decided to retain a judicial veto 
to enhance the political legitimacy of the mechanisms, and reduce the 
likelihood of negative public safety impacts.  Since judges are 
accountable to the communities that elected them, they may be more 
reluctant to approve earned releases than state officials.  State agency 
officials, such as DOC and ERRC personnel, could potentially feel 
pressure to make questionable release decisions to save costs or reduce 
overcrowding because they are accountable to other administrators, not 
the voters.  Indeed, recent earned release legislation in other states has 
already run into controversy for allegedly unwise releases.160 
Giving judges veto power over decisions is one way to reduce such 
abuses and prevent the ensuing political backlash.  The advantage of 
 
157. E-mail from Anthony Streveler, supra note 104. 
158. Id. 
159. See supra Part II.A.  The only mechanism for which the judicial veto seems 
particularly out of place is positive adjustment time; even those inmates who get their 
sentence reduced for good behavior must obtain judicial approval before being released.  See 
supra Part II.C.  This differs from the typical “good time” statute, which in Wisconsin, while it 
existed, automatically reduced inmates’ sentences when they avoided major disciplinary 
infractions.  See WIS. STAT. § 973.01 (2009–2010), repealed by 2011 Wis. Act 38, §§ 88–89. 
160. See Klingele, Changing the Sentence, supra note 8, at 494–97.  See generally supra 
note 4 and accompanying text; Klingele, Early Demise, supra note 9. 
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Wisconsin’s approach from 2009 to 2011 was that state officials were 
initially in charge of the process, potentially reducing the disparities that 
could result from a judge-focused earned release system, and only when 
judges were willing to hold a hearing could they intervene in the 
process.  This system made it less likely that certain judges would veto 
all earned release applications, potentially causing geographic or racial 
disparities.   
The ability of Wisconsin judges to reduce sentences in response to 
common law sentence modification motions is an even better example 
of an appropriate role for judges in earned release.  Judges in Wisconsin 
state courts may only grant these common law sentence modifications 
when the facts of the case conform to specific doctrines.161  For this 
reason, sentence modification motions are normally granted only in 
relatively unusual circumstances.162  The main common law doctrine, 
new-factor sentence modification, requires a court to find that a “new 
factor” occurred after sentencing or prior to sentencing without the 
knowledge of the parties at sentencing, and that a sentence modification 
is thus needed to avoid injustice.163  Since judges are more qualified than 
state officials to consider the relevance of particular facts for abstract 
notions of justice, it may be more appropriate for judges to decide such 
issues.  However, if administrative officials have control over an entire 
state’s earned release system, these officials can be trained to consider 
the same types of factors, as discussed below.164 
Despite making a normative argument, this Part does not articulate 
a general principle for states to follow to successfully implement earned 
release.  In choosing what roles, if any, to assign to judges in the earned 
 
161. Katherine R. Kruse & Kim E. Patterson, Comment, Wisconsin Sentence 
Modification: A View from the Trial Court, 1989 WIS. L. REV. 441, 443, 446–48.  See generally 
Norris, supra note 60. 
162. See Kruse & Patterson, supra note 170, at 462.  Some examples of new factors 
approved by appellate courts include “new information about the defendant’s criminal 
record, post-conviction assistance to law enforcement, misunderstandings about the 
consequences of the sentence, a clarification to the law relevant to the sentence, the existence 
of an untreatable psychological condition, a reduction of the defendant’s restitution, and a 
conflict of interest on the part of the person who prepared a psychological report on the 
defendant.”  Norris, supra note 60, at 13. 
163. Rosado v. State, 70 Wis. 2d. 280, 288–89, 234 N.W.2d 69, 73 (1975) (defining a new 
factor as “fact or set of facts highly relevant to the imposition of sentence, but not known to 
the trial judge at the time of original sentencing, either because it was not then in existence or 
because, even though it was then in existence, it was unknowingly overlooked by all of the 
parties”). 
164. See infra Part III.B.1.b. 
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release process, state policymakers must make public policy judgments 
based on the values that are most important to them.  This may involve 
compromising among competing considerations, such as the importance 
of uniformity and fairness on the one hand, and the value in making 
electorally accountable officials responsible for decisions that will 
impact their constituencies on the other. 
The shift toward judicial control created by the 2011 legislation,165 
however, may have gone too far.  For inmates sentenced after the year 
2000 (truth-in-sentencing inmates), the only currently available earned 
release mechanisms are sentence adjustment, compassionate release, 
and modification of probation (which all require judicial approval) as 
well as program-based mechanisms (which require that a judge declare 
the offender eligible at sentencing).166  Since compassionate release is 
not applicable to most offenders, and early discharge of probation does 
not apply to prison inmates, most inmates have only two realistic 
options for earned release: sentence adjustment and program-based 
release.  Program-based release is only available to those with substance 
abuse problems, and there are a limited number of spots available.167  
This leaves judicial sentence adjustment—with its extreme geographic, 
and possibly racial, disparities168—as the most widely-applicable form of 
earned release. 
Moreover, for those who accrued positive adjustment time between 
2009 and 2011, judges can now reject their petition for earned release 
without any hearing, and must hold a hearing to grant positive 
adjustment time.169  This reverses the situation in force between 2009 
and 2011, which required judges to hold a hearing before rejecting a 
petition.170  The 2011 change creates incentives for busy courts to dismiss 
all petitions for positive adjustment time, which could further 
 
165. See, e.g., 2011 Wis. Act 38, § 45 (giving the court the authority to review the 
department’s determination that an inmate is eligible for release due to an extraordinary 
health condition and hold a hearing to determine if release is in the public interest); 2011 Wis. 
Act 38, § 93b (amending WIS. STAT. § 973.08(3)(d)(intro.) (2009–2010) and giving the 
sentencing court the sole authority to discharge someone from probation early). 
166. See supra Part II.C. 
167. See supra note 98 and accompanying text. 
168. See supra note 146 and accompanying text. 
169. 2011 Wis. Act 38, § 96 (creating WIS. STAT. § 973.198(3), which gives the court 
authority to deny a petition outright or hold a hearing, and WIS. STAT. § 973.198(5), which 
dictates how positive adjustment time should be applied to a bifurcated sentence). 
170. WIS. STAT. § 304.06(1)(bk)(1), repealed by 2011 Wis. Act 38, § 59. 
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disadvantaged offenders from populous counties (where most of the 
state’s minorities reside).171 
Whatever the division of labor between judges and administrators, 
the principles articulated later in this Part will still be applicable.  This 
said, a system with minimal or no judicial involvement will likely be 
easier to manage and implement in a flexible way, since the autonomy 
of judges may make them less susceptible to influence than state 
officials.  For example, if policymakers are concerned that state officials 
are not approving meritorious requests for release, they could fire or 
discipline the officials.  This would obviously not be a possibility for 
elected judges. 
2. Broadening Compassionate Release 
A second positive aspect of Wisconsin’s 2009 earned release 
legislation is that the provisions for compassionate release were far 
broader than in the previous statute.  The TIS-II statute known as 
“terminal/geriatric release,” in force from 2003 to 2009, allowed judges 
to release TIS inmates with either less than six months to live, who were 
sixty-five years old and had served five years of their sentence, or who 
were sixty years old and had served ten years of their sentence.172  The 
judge could only exercise that authority after the prison’s Program 
Review Committee signed off on the request.173  The 2009 legislation 
 
171. 82% of inmates who were convicted in Milwaukee County (the most populous 
county in the state) were African-American.  See Wis. Dep’t of Health Servs., Wisconsin 
Population Estimates, http://www.dhs.wisconsin.gov/population/ (indicating that Milwaukee 
County has a population nearly twice that of the second most populous county, Dane 
County).  Roughly 70% of the African-Americans in Wisconsin reside in Milwaukee County.  
U.S. Census Bureau, Wisconsin Quick Facts, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/55000.htm
l (indicating that the 2010 population of Wisconsin was 5,686,986 and that 6.3% of the 
population was African-American); U.S. Census Bureau, Milwaukee County Quick Facts, 
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/55/55079.html (indicating that Milwaukee County has a 
population of 947,735, of which 26.8% are black); see also African Americans in Wisconsin, 
WIS. DEP’T OF HEALTH SERVICES, http://www.dhs.wisconsin.gov/health/minorityhealth/ 
mhpop/africanameripop2009.htm (“Nearly 90% of Wisconsin’s African American population 
lives in the following six counties, all of which are located in Southeastern or Southern 
Wisconsin, including Milwaukee, Dane, Racine, Kenosha, Rock, and Waukesha.  When 
looking at African Americans as a percent of the total county population Milwaukee County 
tops this list, with 25.6%.”); WIS. DEP’T OF HEALTH SERVICES, Hispanics/Latinos in 
Wisconsin, http://www.dhs.wisconsin.gov/health/minorityhealth/mhpop/hispaniclatinopop.htm 
(“As of 2008, two-thirds of Wisconsin’s Hispanic/Latino population was concentrated in 
Milwaukee, Dane, Racine, Kenosha, and Brown counties.”). 
172. WIS. STAT. § 302.1135 (2009–2010), amended by 2011 Wis. Act 38, § 47. 
173. Id. 
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made several improvements.174  The 2011 measures left some of these 
changes in place, but gave judges veto power and made certain inmates 
ineligible for compassionate release.175 
First, while retaining provisions that allowed release for those of a 
certain age who have served a certain amount of time in prison, the 2009 
statute removed the terminal diagnosis requirement and instead 
required a showing of an “extraordinary health condition.”176  This 
condition, which had to be documented by affidavits from two 
physicians, could include age, infirmity, disability or a condition that 
cannot be treated in the institution.177  This essentially allowed the 
ERRC to release inmates because of virtually any age- or health-related 
problem.178  This is similar to New Jersey’s statute and the proposed 
Model Penal Code Revision’s compassionate release provision, both of 
which give judges broad discretion to decide when age, health, or 
disability justifies release.179  Such flexibility is important because 
compassionate release decisions are likely to be very fact specific, 
hinging on the particulars of the inmate’s condition and the likelihood 
that he or she could commit crimes if released.  Fortunately, the 2011 
reforms did not reverse this change in the law.180 
Second, from 2009 to 2011, administrators alone made 
compassionate release decisions, as the judge did not have to pre-
approve each release.181  While it is ultimately a public policy judgment 
 
174. See infra Part III.A. 
175. 2011 Wisconsin Act 38, § 45 (creating WIS. STAT. § 302.113(9g)). 
176. 2009 Wis. Act 28, § 2729y (amending WIS. STAT. § 302.1135(3) (2009–2010), which 
was repealed by 2011 Wis. Act 38, § 47). 
177. WIS. STAT. 302.113(9g)(a)(1), repealed by 2009 Wis. Act 28.  
178. However, it is possible that since the legislation does not mention “illness,” that a 
grave illness that does not qualify as an infirmity or disability would not be grounds for 
release.  This said, if a serious illness will prevent an inmate from committing further crimes 
for the rest of his life, this can fairly be described as a disability or infirmity.  Thus the absence 
of the term “illness” should not pose an obstacle to meritorious compassionate release 
requests. 
179. In New Jersey, “A motion may be filed and an order may be entered at any time . . . 
amending a custodial sentence to permit the release of a defendant because of illness or 
infirmity of the defendant or . . . changing a sentence for good cause shown upon the joint 
application of the defendant and prosecuting attorney.”  N.J. CT. R. 3:21-10(b) (2009); see 
also Frase, supra note 7, at 195 (analyzing proposal to change Model Penal Code’s 
compassionate release provisions). 
180. See 2011 Wis. Act 38, § 45 (retaining the previous definition of “extraordinary 
health condition,” and allowing release of those with such conditions). 
181. WIS. STAT. § 302.1135 (2009–2010), repealed by 2011 Wis. Act 38, § 47.  Section 
302.1135(8) did permit a person to obtain judicial review of a decision to deny compassionate 
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whether judges should retain the right to veto earned release decisions, 
it makes for a simpler process to remove the judicial veto.  In addition, 
since the ERRC would have had comprehensive information about the 
offender’s crime and conduct in prison, a sense of when other petitions 
have been granted, and extensive knowledge about the inmate’s physical 
abilities, the ERRC was well-positioned institutionally to make 
compassionate release decisions in a consistent and public safety-
protective manner.  The fact that the Program Review Committee’s 
approval was no longer necessary was also a welcome change, because it 
removed an additional, potentially duplicative bureaucratic obstacle.182 
The 2011 legislation requires that the compassionate release be 
approved first by the prison’s Program Review Committee and then by 
a judge, who is required to hold a hearing.183  The inmate must “prov[e] 
by the greater weight of the credible evidence” that the release would be 
in the public interest.184  While there are reasons to prefer that the 
decision be made by administrators alone, it is understandable that the 
legislature wanted the judge to make the final determination.  The 
“greater weight” standard (which has been in effect since compassionate 
release was passed as part of the TIS-II legislation) seems appropriate, 
because it is not a high standard (like “clear and convincing evidence,” 
the standard applicable for “new factor” sentence modification185) that 
would present an additional obstacle toward compassionate release. 
Third, the 2009 legislation applied to inmates convicted of class B 
felonies, which expanded the pool of inmates eligible under the statute, 
but the 2011 legislation reversed this change.186  Class B felonies include 
such crimes as first-degree reckless homicide, second-degree intentional 
homicide, and first-degree sexual assault.  The policy judgment reflected 
in the pre-2009 statute and the 2011 legislation—that the most serious 
and violent criminals should never be released on age or health 
 
release by filing a common law writ of certiorari.  For a detailed analysis of the changes made 
to the compassionate release statute by Act 28, see O’Meara, supra note 66, at 34. 
182. See O’Meara, supra note 66, at 34. 
183. In this respect, the 2011 legislation returns compassionate release to the procedure 
established by the TIS-II legislation.  2011 Wis. Act 38, § 45 (creating WIS. STAT. 
§ 302.113(9g)(cm), which requires the sentencing court to hold a hearing after the Program 
Committee has determined modification is appropriate); see also O’Meara, supra note 66, at 
34. 
184. 2011 Wis. Act 38, § 45 (creating WIS. STAT. § 302.113 (9g)(e)). 
185. State v. Franklin, 148 Wis. 2d 1, 7–9, 434 N.W.2d 609, 611 (1989). 
186. 2011 Wis. Act 38, § 47, repealing WIS. STAT. § 302.1135 (2009–2010).  The statute 
simply omits the classification-based limitations the statute previously contained.  Id. 
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grounds—is easy to sympathize with.  However, one could argue that 
decision-makers should always have the discretion to release an inmate 
who is so incapacitated by an illness, such as paralysis or advanced 
dementia, that additional offenses are impossible.  Such an approach 
would allow each case to be evaluated on its own merits, without 
excluding offenders based on their offense. 
The principle behind this policy can be articulated as follows.  The 
additional incarceration that an incurably sick or disabled offender 
would experience if he or she is not released would have some abstract 
punishment or retributive value.  But this value, even in this case of the 
most serious offenders, will often be outweighed by the lack of risk to 
the public, the potential cost savings to the public, and the benefits for 
the dignity and quality of the life of the offender and his or her family.  
Only an actor familiar with the all the facts is in a position to decide 
whether compassionate release is justified in a particular case. 
Indeed, compassionate release statutes are an example of an earned 
release mechanism that by its very nature should be broad and 
bureaucratically uncomplicated.  Obviously, the narrower the rules, the 
fewer health-incapacitated inmates will be released.  More onerous and 
multi-layered bureaucratic requirements are also certain to reduce the 
number of those released by slowing down the process, discouraging 
potential applicants, and giving more actors the opportunity to veto 
requests. 
The small numbers of inmates released through most compassionate 
release statutes across the country makes this simplicity and broadness 
all the more important.187  Indeed, over the last two years, only six 
inmates achieved compassionate release, a small fraction of the thirty to 
fifty inmates who die in prison each year.188  The general principles 
 
187. See CHIU, supra note 66, at 6–8 (showing, based on a study of 15 states and the 
District of Columbia, that states rarely use their geriatric release statutes); Cara Buckley, Law 
Has Little Impact on Compassionate Release for Ailing Inmates, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2010, at 
A17 (describing how in New York and several other states, compassionate release statutes 
were on the books but often resulted in only a small handful of releases per year). 
188. This said, it is possible that many or most of the inmates who died could not have 
been released through compassionate release, either because their deaths were unexpected or 
because they were ineligible due to being convicted of a Class A offense.  E-mail from 
Anthony Streveler, Wis. Dep’t of Corr., to author (Nov. 19, 2011) [hereinafter E-mail from 
Anthony Streveler Nov.] (providing fact that six inmates had been released).  Fifty-two 
inmates died in 2002, forty-three in 2003, forty in 2004, thirty-one in 2005, forty-five in 2006, 
forty-three in 2007, forty-five in 2008, forty-two in 2009, twenty-five in 2010, and forty-nine in 
2011.  E-mail from Bonnie Utech, Records Custodian, Wis. Dep’t of Corr. (Feb. 15, 2012). 
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developed below, in particular the principle of responsive governance 
discussed in Part III.B.2, may help in preventing the under-use of 
compassionate release.  In any case, if policymakers want to realize the 
full potential of compassionate release, they should consider instituting 
a process in which all gravely ill or elderly eligible inmates are 
automatically considered, instead of relying on individual inmates to 
obtain a diagnosis and petition for earned release on their own accord. 
3. Prioritizing Public Safety 
Another encouraging development in Wisconsin’s 2009 earned 
release legislation was the careful, if uneven, attention paid to ensuring 
that release is compatible with public safety.  The legislation required 
the state to develop empirically validated criteria for approving earned 
release and, as a result, the DOC implemented an improved system for 
evaluating the risks posed by individual inmates.189  The earned release 
legislation also focused on nonviolent offenders, making violent 
offenders eligible for only a small number of relatively restrictive earned 
release mechanisms.190 
First, the legislation directed the ERRC and DOC to develop 
scientific criteria for evaluating the likelihood that an individual 
offender will commit certain offenses.191  At the same time, this 
“validated and objective assessment of the inmate’s criminogenic factors 
and risk of reoffending” only applies to two of the many earned release 
mechanisms.192  Even though its use is only statutorily required for two 
 
189. Interview with Anthony Streveler, Wis. Dep’t of Corr. (May 5, 2010) [hereinafter 
Interview with Anthony Streveler May]; E-mail from Anthony Streveler, Wis. Dep’t 
Corrections (Dec. 5, 2011). 
190. 2009 Wis. Act 28, § 2751.  For example, PAT-B and PAT-C release were available 
to some inmates convicted of violent offenses, but these releases were subject to the 
discretionary approval of the ERRC and the judge.  See supra notes 125–27, 130 and 
accompanying text.  Similarly, some violent offenders were eligible for compassionate release, 
but compassionate release requires an extraordinary health condition and is subject to 
discretionary approval as well.  See supra notes 75 and accompanying text.  ERRC release 
was not available to those convicted of Class A or B felonies, which include the most serious 
violent crimes.  See supra notes 99, 100 and accompanying text; WIS. STAT. §§ 940.01, 940.02, 
940.05, 940.225 (indicating that first-degree intentional homicide is a Class A felony, several 
forms of homicide, and first-degree sexual assault, are Class B felonies). 
191. WIS. STAT. § 302.042(2)(a) (2009–2010), repealed by 2011 Wis. Act 38, § 13 
(requiring the DOC to “[c]onduct a validated and objective assessment of the inmate’s 
criminogenic factors and risk of reoffending” to release an inmate through a risk reduction 
sentence). 
192. Id. 
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forms of earned release, in practice the DOC and ERRC used an 
improved risk assessment tool for deciding upon other releases, as well 
as deciding upon the intensity of supervision that offenders will be 
subject to upon release.193  As long as the evaluation instrument is 
empirically valid, this is surely preferable to ad hoc decisions based on 
informal reviews of inmates’ institutional conduct and post-release 
plans. 
Although the DOC had long used a methodologically problematic 
instrument, the DOC has developed an improved assessment 
procedure.194  The Justice Center performed a sophisticated analysis of 
the state’s current risk evaluation instrument, proposing specific changes 
that would result in significant improvements.195  For example, the 
analysis found that the old instrument classified too large a percentage 
of offenders as high-risk, making it less useful for distributing resources 
toward offenders who pose the greatest risk, and suggested ways to 
correct the problem.196  The DOC adopted a new instrument correcting 
these flaws, which was immediately implemented and used for all the 
2009–2011 earned releases.197 
In any case, as mentioned below, care must be taken to avoid giving 
undue weight to these assessment tools, especially when other 
considerations not incorporated by the tools are relevant to recidivism.198  
Professor Hannah-Moffat has identified a number of potential problems 
with relying on risk assessment in sentencing-related decisions, such as 
the potential for overreliance on risk assessment because of excessive 
trust in its predictive ability, confusion between correlation and 
causation, and potential bias against women and minorities.199  
 
193. Risk reduction sentences required this assessment, and positive adjustment time 
(PAT-B and PAT-C) did not apply to those determined to have a high risk of reoffending 
through an “objective risk assessment instrument.”  WIS. STAT. § 973.01(3)(d) (2009–2010), 
repealed by 2011 Wis. Act 38, § 88; see also Interview with Anthony Streveler May, supra note 
189. 
194. Interview with Anthony Streveler May, supra note 189; see also MIKE EISENBERG 
ET AL., COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS JUSTICE CENTER, VALIDATION OF THE 
WISCONSIN DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS RISK ASSESSMENT INSTRUMENT, at iv, vii–
ix (2009), available at http://www.wi-doc.com/PDF_Files/WIRiskValidation_August%2020 
09.pdf. 
195. EISENBERG ET AL., supra note 194, at vii–viii. 
196. Id. at iv–vii. 
197. Interview with Anthony Streveler May, supra note 189. 
198. See infra notes 199–201. 
199. See Hannah-Moffat, supra note 11 (manuscript at 14–15, 17). 
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Practitioners need to be made aware of these limitations and biases.  In 
particular, given Professor Harcourt’s claim that risk assessment 
instruments will increase racial disparities, care should be taken to 
ensure the tools are not unfairly disadvantageous to minorities.200  
However, so far in Wisconsin, this may not be a problem: the analysis of 
the old risk assessment tool showed that it did not result in racial bias.201 
Second, under the 2009 earned release measures, violent and more 
serious offenders were ineligible for some of the mechanisms.  For other 
mechanisms, they had to serve significantly longer proportions of their 
sentences before being eligible for earned release.202  This said, the 
complexity of the eligibility criteria for the various mechanisms might 
appear excessive, and invite public criticism or even ridicule.  For 
example, a risk reduction sentence may have applied to someone 
convicted of a violent class B felony such as second-degree intentional 
homicide but not to someone who interfered with a police GPS device 
(an offense specifically excluded by the statute).203  Third, the ability of 
the judge to veto some earned release decisions meant that someone 
 
200. See Harcourt, supra note 12 (manuscript at 2, 9). 
201. EISENBERG ET AL., supra note 194, at 25; E-mail from Anthony Streveler, supra 
note 16. 
202. The risk reduction sentence statute did not apply to those convicted of various 
offenses, many of them violent, such as kidnapping and reckless homicide, but it still applied 
to many violent offenders.  WIS. STAT. § 973.031 (2009–2010), repealed by 2011 Wis. Act 38, 
§ 92.  “Certain early release” was only available for inmates convicted of nonviolent offenses, 
and as a further precaution, the prison social worker or extended supervision agent must have 
had a “reason to believe” that the offender would not engage in assaultive activity in the 
community.  See supra note 84 and accompanying text.  PAT-A earned release at 67% of the 
sentence was only available to those convicted of misdemeanors and certain nonviolent 
felonies, and those convicted of sex offenses and certain other offenses were ineligible.  PAT-
B earned release allowed inmates convicted of violent offenses and certain nonviolent 
offenses to be released up to 25% earned.  WIS. STAT. § 304.06(1)(bg)(1) (2009–2010), 
repealed by 2011 Wis. Act 38, § 58.  As with PAT-A, those convicted of sexual and other 
specified offenses were ineligible.  Id.  PAT-C release was available for those convicted of 
more serious felonies, including violent offenses, but many offenses, including certain violent 
and sex offenses, were excluded.  Id. § 304.06(1)(bg)(2), repealed by 2011 Wis. Act 38, § 58.  
Thus, violent offenders are often ineligible for earned release, and when they are, they cannot 
gain release as early as nonviolent offenders. 
203. WIS. STAT. § 973.031 (2009–2010), repealed by 2011 Wis. Act 38, § 92 (excluding 
those convicted of WIS. STAT. § 946.465, which prohibits tampering with GPS devices).  As 
Judge Richard Sankovitz noted, “The list of exceptions is peculiar and may be subject to 
change with future legislation.  For example, [Risk Reduction Sentences] sentencing is not 
available in second degree homicide cases, but it is available in first degree homicide cases.”  
Richard J. Sankovitz, Sentencing Toolbox Department Q&A: Risk Reduction Sentences, 
THIRD BRANCH, Winter 2010, at 6, 6, available at http://www.wicourts.gov/news/thirdbranch 
/docs/winter10.pdf. 
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accountable to communities has a role in the decision.  As noted above, 
this may result in extra attention being paid to the release of violent or 
other serious offenders, perhaps reducing the number of released 
offenders who commit serious crimes. 
While these features cannot prevent earned release from causing any 
public safety problems, the fact that there were numerous measures in 
place to protect public safety could have potentially blunted the public 
reaction to particular incidents of releasees committing serious crimes.  
As it happened, the 2011 repeal of most of the 2009 earned release 
mechanisms did not seem to be stimulated by any particular event (such 
as a releasee committing a terrible crime), but rather by the political 
preferences of new officeholders.204  As discussed in Part III.B below, 
ensuring that earned release is compatible with public safety is a core 
principle for successfully implementing earned release, and treating 
violent offenders differently than nonviolent offenders is one potentially 
defensible way to do this. 
4. Addressing Reentry and Revocations 
A final positive element in the 2009 legislation was the introduction 
of three measures (only one of which was repealed in 2011) to reduce 
recidivism and revocations from probation or extended supervision.  
These include mechanisms allowing for earned release from community 
supervision sentences,205 requirements that the DOC work to lower 
revocation rates,206 and the establishment of the Council on Offender 
Reentry.207  The availability of new funding for some of this work is a 
positive sign, but implementation remains uncertain. 
First, as described in Part II, a judge can discharge an offender from 
probation if the offender has successfully completed half of the 
probation term, and from 2009 to 2011, the DOC could unilaterally 
release offenders from either probation or extended supervision.208  Such 
policies are potentially very significant because the majority of prisoners 
 
204. See supra note 57–59 and accompanying text. 
205. 2009 Wis. Act 28, § 2666 (amending Wis. Stat. § 301.03(3) (2009–2010)). 
206. 2009 Wis. Act 28, § 2669h (creating WIS. STAT. § 301.068 (2009–2010), which 
establishes community services to reduce recidivism). 
207. 2009 Wis. Act 28, §§ 34(g) (creating WIS. STAT. § 15.145 (2009–2010), which 
describes the Council); 2009 Wis. Act 28, § 2669k (creating WIS. STAT. § 301.095, which 
establishes the function of the Council). 
208. WIS. STAT. § 973.01(4m) (2009–2010), repealed by 2011 Wis. Act 38 § 90; WIS. 
STAT. § 973.09(3)(d) (2009–2010), amended by 2011 Wis. Act 38 § 93b. 
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entering Wisconsin state prisons have been revoked from probation or 
extended supervision for technical violations, rather than for committing 
a new offense.209  The longer the period of supervision, the more likely 
technical violations are to occur.210  When offenders have successfully 
completed a large proportion of their supervision sentence and the 
judge or administrative decision-maker believes them to be a low public 
safety risk, it is appropriate to shorten their sentences.  Besides allowing 
community corrections resources to be spent on higher-priority 
offenders, modifying these sentences should reduce the prison 
population by lowering the number of revocations.  Since 2009, the 
DOC has discharged at least sixty-five offenders from extended 
supervision (parole) and twenty-two from probation, resulting in an 
overall reduction of 145 years of supervision.211  This is not an 
overwhelming amount, but it indicates the DOC’s willingness to 
implement this earned release policy. 
Second, the 2009 legislation requires the DOC to provide training 
and skill development to community corrections officers with the goal of 
 
209. “Dr. Tony Fabelo, Director of Research, Justice Reinvestment Initiative, CSG 
Justice Center . . . reported that [Wisconsin] revocations without a new sentence accounted 
for 50% of prison admissions in 2000 and 61% of admissions in 2007.”  WIS. LEGIS. COUNCIL, 
SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE REINVESTMENT INITIATIVE OVERSIGHT 6 (2010), 
available at http://legis.wisconsin.gov/lc/publications/rl/rl_2009_12_jrio.pdf; see also BUREAU 
OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SPECIAL REPORT: PROBATION AND PAROLE VIOLATORS IN STATE 
PRISONS, 1991, at 2 (1995) (defining a technical violation as any violation of the conditions of 
parole other than a new conviction for a criminal offense); COUNCIL OF STATE 
GOVERNMENTS JUSTICE CENTER, JUSTICE REINVESTMENT IN WISCONSIN ANALYSES & 
POLICY OPTIONS TO REDUCE SPENDING ON CORRECTIONS AND INCREASE PUBLIC SAFETY 
4 (2009), available at http://nicic.gov/Library/023753 (“Between 2000 and 2007, the number of 
people admitted to prison [in Wisconsin] who did not comply with the conditions of their 
community supervision increased 40 percent.  The number of people admitted to prison who 
committed new offenses, however, decreased 11 percent.”); Todd R. Clear and James Austin, 
Reducing Mass Incarceration: Implications of the Iron Law of Prison Populations, 3 
HARVARD L. & POL’Y REV. 307, 317–18 (2009) (arguing that technical revocations could be 
eliminated with “minimal public safety implications” by employing alternative sanctions for 
rule violations). 
210. David E. Olson & Arthur J. Lurigio, Predicting Probation Outcomes: Factors 
Associated with Probation Rearrest, Revocations, and Technical Violations During 
Supervision, 2 JUST. RES. & POL’Y 73, 82 (2000) (using Illinois probation data to show that 
“sentence length was a predictor of probation revocation and technical violations but not of 
new arrests”). 
211. E-mail from Anthony Streveler, Wis. Dep’t of Corr. (Dec. 5, 2011).  The 
Department of Corrections calculated that these releases reduced total supervision by 53,071 
days, which is over 145 years.  Id. 
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reducing recidivism and reducing the overall revocation rate.212  The 
Department appears to have succeeded in reducing revocation rates at 
least somewhat over the last two years.213  However, the 2009 budget did 
not initially allocate additional resources to implement this statute, and 
the legislation does not specify exactly what the department must do, 
other than report on its progress.214 
This said, a ten-million dollar fund, “Becky Young Community 
Corrections” fund, was finalized by the state government in 2010.215  
These funds will make possible a variety of new programs and 
initiatives, including the statutorily-mandated efforts to reduce 
revocations.  Implementation so far has already resulted in the hiring of 
employment coordinators to help those on probation or extended 
supervision to find employment, additional staff to evaluate the 
effectiveness of programs, new vocational training for inmates, and 
expanded mental health services for offenders.216 
The legislature passed a version of the bill setting a goal of reducing 
the revocation rate by 25%, but then-Governor Doyle vetoed this 
provision.217  Without a definite goal or specific directions, the fate of 
this provision depends on the ingenuity and sustained attention of the 
DOC.  Ideally, the vast savings that could result from substantially 
reducing revocations would motivate the department to aggressively 
implement this statutory mandate.  But no one should assume this will 
occur.  Notably, the process of requesting the Becky Young funds 
requires the department to create a comprehensive plan for its 
implementation of the new community corrections legislation, which 
 
212. 2009 WIS. Act 28, § 2669h (creating WIS. STAT. § 301.068 (2009–2010), dealing with 
community services aimed at reducing recidivism and specifically § 301.068(5), which required 
the Department of Corrections to provide training to probation, parole, and extended 
supervision agents). 
213. E-mail from Anthony Streveler, supra note 16 (explaining that overall revocation 
rates have been falling, and sending internal data showing lower rates of revocations over the 
past two years for women). 
214. 2009 Wis. Act 28, § 2669h (creating WIS. STAT. § 301.068(6) (2009–2010), which was 
vetoed in part to remove the specific 25% reduction in recidivism goal). 
215. Press Release, Lena Taylor, Taylor Applauds Final Approval of Becky Young 
Community Justice Funds: Bi-partisan Investment in Reducing Recidivism Caps Work on 
Corrections Reform (Mar. 16, 2010), http://www.legis.wi.gov/senate/sen04/news/Press/2010/pr
2010-014.asp. 
216. WIS. DEP’T OF CORR., BECKY YOUNG COMMUNITY CORRECTIONS RECIDIVISM 
REDUCTION STATUS FY 2011 REPORT 2, 5–6 (Jul. 14, 2010). 
217. 2009 Wis. Act 28, § 2669(h); WIS. STAT. § 301.068. 
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may serve to focus the department’s efforts.218  There was no such plan, 
in contrast, for the implementation of the other earned release and 
sentencing reforms under TIS-III. 
Third, the 2009 legislation established a Council on Offender 
Reentry, which is to coordinate reentry programs throughout the state.219  
The legislation requires the council to investigate potential funding 
sources for reentry initiatives, including federal funds; to promote 
collaboration and coordination among different agencies and non-state 
entities relating to offender reentry; to encourage public input and 
participation; to promote research and evaluation of reentry programs; 
and to review existing reentry programs to ensure there is evidence they 
are effective.220  The federal government has already awarded the state a 
$1.5 million grant for reentry initiatives.221  If the Council focuses on 
achieving all of its goals, as opposed to focusing mainly on how to secure 
federal grants, it could help reduce recidivism and revocations (and thus 
the prison population) by expanding reentry efforts and improving their 
effectiveness.  However, there is no indication yet how active this 
council will be, and virtually no information about its activities is 
available to the public.  Unfortunately, the Council did not meet for the 
first time until December 2010, over a year after the legislation passed.222   
These three developments all represent ways for the state to reduce 
revocations and recidivism through the better use of correctional 
resources in the community.  As discussed below in Part III.B.4, such 
strategies should be a key element accompanying any earned release 
reform, because of their potential to cut corrections costs and reduce 
prison populations in ways consistent with public safety.  However, 
effective implementation of these three provisions is not guaranteed.  
 
218. Interview with Anthony Streveler May, supra note 189. 
219. 2009 Wis. Act 28, § 34g (creating WIS. STAT. § 15.145(5) (2009–2010), establishing 
the Council on Offender Reentry); 2009 Wis. Act 28, § 2669k (creating WIS. STAT. § 301.095 
(2009–2010), describing the duties of the Council on Offender Reentry). 
220. 2009 Wis. Act 28, § 2669k (creating WIS. STAT. § 301.095 (2009–2010)). 
221. Wisconsin Department of Corrections, Department-Wide Transfer Announcement, 
Program & Policy Analyst: Advanced Second Chance Act Coordinator (Sept.  2010)  
http://www.wi-doc.com/Employment_pdf/Transfer%20PPA%20Adv%209% 
2010%20DEPT.pdf.  
222. E-mail from Anthony Streveler, Wis. Dep’t of Corr. (Jan. 17, 2011) (indicating that 
the Council did not meet until December 2010); 2009 Wis. Act 28.  The opinions expressed 
here are mine, not Mr. Streveler’s. 
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As discussed below, ongoing, organized efforts are needed to ensure 
implementation.223 
5. Multiplying Mechanisms 
One potential disadvantage of Wisconsin’s earned release system is 
the multiplication and frequent alteration of earned released 
mechanisms over time.  After Act 28 went into effect in 2009, there were 
no fewer than ten earned release mechanisms applying to at least some 
offenders.224  It seems likely a smaller number of mechanisms would 
cause less confusion (and lead to less litigation on the nature of the 
mechanisms and their interrelationships with one another).  At the same 
time, the large number of mechanisms might have salutary effects by 
broadening the availability of earned release and increasing the chances 
that one of the mechanisms will be effective.  Regardless, the topsy-
turvy history of earned release over the past decade and a half also 
compounds the problem of complexity by potentially reducing actors’ 
confidence in the permanence of the mechanisms. 
Obviously, there is something to be said for simplicity.  Simple 
legislation—creating a smaller number of mechanisms giving decision-
makers ample discretion—would be far less confusing to inmates, 
judges, lawyers, and prison officials, and require less (if any) litigation to 
clarify.  Creating numerous and complex earned release mechanisms 
may cause interaction and compatibility problems, potentially 
necessitating expensive litigation and a prolonged rule-making process. 
However, it is possible that establishing numerous earned release 
mechanisms could have beneficial results.  For example, the large 
number of mechanisms means that more inmates are eligible, and may 
give many inmates more than one chance at earned release.  It also 
allows mechanisms to be tailored to particular classes of inmates—for 
example, ERRC release was presumably designed to make it easier for 
TIS-I and TIS-II inmates to achieve release than under the original 
judicial version of sentence adjustment.225  It certainly worked: 469 
inmates were released through ERRC release from 2009 to its repeal in 
2011, accounting for 75% of the total earned releases during that time.226 
 
223. Infra Part III.A.6. 
224. See 2009 Wis. Act 28, §§ 2703–12 (creating WIS. STAT. § 302.05, which outlined the 
earned release program). 
225. See supra Part II.C. 
226. E-mail from Anthony Streveler Nov., supra note 188. 
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Moreover, the more mechanisms there are, the more likely it is that 
one of them will actually work, and succeed in releasing a sizable 
number of inmates without public safety incidents.  For example, if the 
additional programming needed for the implementation of certain 
mechanisms never materializes, or if judges fail to make inmates eligible 
for risk reduction sentences or program-based release, officials could 
rely on other mechanisms.227  If one mechanism turns out to be most 
effective in releasing individuals who do not recidivate, the legislature 
could abolish the other mechanisms, benefitting from the quasi-
experimental nature of the multiple mechanisms.228 
Finally, when there are a large number of mechanisms, then even 
when political winds shift, politicians wishing to appear tough on crime 
may abolish some of the mechanisms but not others, allowing earned 
release to continue at a similar pace.  In fact, though current Republican 
Governor Scott Walker promised to repeal the new earned release 
legislation, he did not repeal all of it: eligibility for compassionate 
release based on an “extraordinary health condition” and earned release 
from probation (two 2009 reforms) remain in force, as does judicial 
sentence adjustment.229 
Another problem is that, viewed over time, Wisconsin’s multi-
pronged earned release system may seem like an ever-shifting mess, 
which could undermine confidence in the system and create uncertainty 
about the future.  To review, Wisconsin long had an indeterminate 
sentencing system, featuring sentence credit and parole release, both of 
which the legislature abolished in 2000.230  From 2000 to 2003, truth-in-
sentencing (TIS-I) was in full force, but the legislature failed to pass the 
earned release mechanisms that had been expected to accompany truth-
 
227. For example, under the reforms in place from 2009–2011, even if the judge did not 
sentence an offender to a risk reduction sentence, he or she could be released through 
positive adjustment time.  See supra notes 94, 111 and accompanying text. 
228. Ideally a similar process would occur on a larger scale, in which earned release 
mechanisms that have been shown to be effective in some states would be adopted and 
further improved in other jurisdictions.  See Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A 
Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267, 403–04 (1998) 
(explaining a philosophy of law and governance centering on local units free to innovate in 
pursuit of common objectives, drawing on good practices from other units). 
229. See supra note 58 and accompanying text; WIS. STAT. § 302.113(9g)(b) (2009–2010) 
(compassionate release); WIS. STAT. § 973.09(3)(d) (2009–2010) (earned release from 
probation); WIS. STAT. § 973.195(1r) (2009–2010) (sentence adjustment). 
230. See supra Part II.B. 
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in-sentencing.231  This meant a dramatic change from indeterminate 
sentencing to one of the most restrictive truth-in-sentencing regimes in 
the country.232 
In 2003, inaugurating TIS-II, the legislature finally passed several 
earned release mechanisms, all of them vesting power mainly in trial 
court judges.233  However, this did not settle matters; considerable 
litigation was necessary to determine various questions about the 
legislation, such as its application to TIS-I inmates.234  During this time, a 
Wisconsin Law Review article described the state’s truth-in-sentencing 
law as “ambiguous,” “confusing,” and “inchoate,”235 and Meredith Ross, 
the director of the Frank J. Remington Center, a legal clinic serving 
prisoners, observed that the “law governing sentence modification and 
earned release is a mess.”236 
As if matters were not confusing enough, in 2009 the legislature, 
through its TIS-III legislation, began phasing out the main TIS-II earned 
release mechanism (sentence adjustment), created several new earned 
release mechanisms, restored sentence credit, and vested power in 
administrative officials for nearly all earned release mechanisms, while 
reducing or eliminating the judicial role.237  Then, merely two years later 
in 2011, the Walker administration turned this all on its head, 
establishing the fifth sentencing era in less than twelve years, by 
abolishing most of the 2009 mechanisms and vesting almost all the 
earned release authority in judges.238 
 
231. State v. Trujillo, 2005 WI 45, ¶ 33, 279 Wis. 2d 712, 694 N.W.2d 933 (Abrahamson, 
C.J., dissenting) (noting that the “undisputed history of TIS-I and TIS-II” shows that “the 
legislature did not intend TIS-I to go into effect until TIS-II was adopted with reduced 
penalties”). 
232. See supra Part II.B. 
233. See supra Part II.B. 
234. Mayrack, supra note 44, at 194 (citing State v. Stenklyft, 2005 WI 71, 281 Wis. 2d 
484, 697 N.W.2d 769; State v. Tucker, 2005 WI 46, 279 Wis. 2d 697, 694 N.W.2d 926; Trujillo, 
2005 WI 45, 279 Wis. 2d 712, 694 N.W.2d 933). 
235. Id. at 194. 
236. Ross, supra note 42, at 13. 
237. See supra Part II.C. 
238. See, e.g., 2011 Wis. Act 38, § 45 (amending WIS. STAT. § 302.113(9g) (2009–2010) 
(giving the court the authority to review the department’s determination that an inmate is 
eligible for release due to an extraordinary health condition and hold a hearing to determine 
if release is in the public interest)); 2011 Wis. Act 38, § 93b (amending WIS. STAT. 
§ 973.08(3)(d)(intro.) (2009–2010) (giving the sentencing court the sole authority to discharge 
someone from probation early); see supra notes 134–135. 
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All four of these transitions were rather abrupt and dramatic.  Given 
this turbulent history, inmates, judges, lawyers, and lawmakers may be 
reluctant to invest too much time or resources in whatever earned 
release mechanisms exist, if they expect the legislature to change 
everything within a few years anyway. 
To avoid these problems, states should carefully consider the timing 
and content of legislative changes.  It is inadvisable to pass historic 
sentencing reforms while delaying accompanying legislation: in 
Wisconsin, this created a uniquely harsh system, drove steep increases in 
imprisonment, and fostered litigation.239  States should try to ensure that 
the mechanisms they choose to establish are sustainable in the long term 
and have clearly defined relationships to one another.  States may want 
to consider a simple earned release system with a small number of 
mechanisms, which gives the relevant actors discretion that is 
appropriately guided but not with such complexity that implementation 
becomes problematic.  For example, a state may choose to establish a 
broad compassionate release statute, a sentence credit mechanism 
allowing the sentence to be reduced as much as 25% for good behavior, 
and a parole-like mechanism permitting an additional reduction of as 
much as 25%. 
6. Uneven Implementation 
One problem with the various earned release mechanisms created in 
2009 was their uneven implementation.  As noted earlier, about seventy-
five percent of earned releases from 2009 to 2011 occurred through a 
single mechanism (ERRC release).240  The three types of positive 
adjustment time—PAT-A, PAT-B, and PAT-C—were applied to two, 
fifty-four, and thirty-nine inmates, respectively.241  Ironically, those non-
violent offenders the legislature indicated were most deserving of 
release—those eligible for PAT-A, or one day off for each two days of 
good behavior—were actually released the least often.242  Fifty-four of 
the total releases were through “certain” earned release, about nine 
percent of the total.243  Program-based release accounted for forty-two of 
 
239. See supra Part II.B. 
240. See supra Part II.C.3. 
241. See supra Part II.C.3. 
242. E-mail from Anthony Streveler Nov., supra note 188.  This discrepancy was 
possibly due to the fact that the Department of Corrections secretary, and not the ERRC as 
with PAT-B and PAT-C, had decision-making authority for PAT-A releases. 
243. Id. 
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the releases.244  Not a single inmate was released through a risk reduction 
sentence.245 
What is perhaps the most disappointing is that only four inmates 
have been released through the new compassionate release provisions, a 
small fraction of the thirty to fifty inmates who die each year.246  It is 
possible that many of these inmates died unexpectedly, were ineligible 
for compassionate release, or remained potentially dangerous to the 
public up to their last day.  Yet it seems possible that at least some of 
these inmates would have been eligible for compassionate release and 
would have posed no public safety risk.  If this is the case, releasing 
them earlier could have saved the state large sums in medical bills and 
allowed the prisoners more dignified and comfortable deaths.  In Part 
III.B.2 below, I discuss how policymakers can prevent potential 
implementation problems. 
7. The Need for Additional Resources and Judicial Education 
Two final issues with Wisconsin’s 2009 earned release forms were 
the state’s slowness in devoting the additional resources needed to 
implement earned release effectively and at least minor problems with 
educating and communicating with judges about the mechanisms.  While 
the Becky Young funds will allow additional resources to be spent on 
community corrections (including for the goal of reducing revocations), 
new resources may also be needed for prison programs. Judicial 
education may have been lacking as the measures first went into effect, 
but subsequent efforts appear to have been adequate.247 
Additional financial resources would probably have been necessary 
for the measures to fully succeed, because some of the mechanisms, 
particularly the risk reduction sentence, required the inmate to have 
completed certain programming.248  Since prison programs were already 
spread thin among the prison population, an expansion of programs was 
 
244. Id. 
245. Id. 
246. Id.; see supra note 188 and accompanying text.  I should note that while Mr. 
Streveler provided me with this data, the opinions expressed here about implementation are 
mine alone. 
247. Interview with Anthony Streveler May, supra note 189. 
248. 2009 Wis. Act 28, § 2699m (creating WIS. STAT. § 302.042 (2009–2010), describing 
the Risk Reduction Program). 
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needed.249  The failure of the legislature to enhance the budget for prison 
programs calls into question the viability of these mechanisms. 
Three considerations, however, may have reduced the seriousness of 
this issue.  First, under the Risk Reduction Sentence, the DOC had 
complete discretion regarding what programs to include in an inmate’s 
individual plan, and the flexibility to alter it at any time.250  This could 
have allowed the inmates to complete their plans and achieve release 
through the Risk Reduction Sentence, though hopefully not by forgoing 
programming necessary for reducing the inmate’s risk to the public.251  
Second, in many cases inmates would have been eligible for release 
through Positive Adjustment Time, which did not explicitly require 
certain programming, at the same time as they were eligible for release 
through the Risk Reduction Sentence.252  Third, the DOC has plans to 
begin systematically applying the evidence-based principle, often 
stressed by the Justice Center, that intensive resources and intervention 
strategies should be directed toward the highest-risk offenders.253  
Despite the lack of new funds for prison programs, the application of 
this principle could ensure that offenders most likely to commit 
additional crimes or particularly serious crimes would have the highest 
priority for programming. 
Judicial education and outreach were important even for the 2009 
reforms, because judges retain some role in several of the mechanisms.  
In particular, for the risk reduction sentence, judges had to declare the 
inmate eligible at sentencing.  While there were some organized efforts 
to educate judges about the new mechanisms, it is not obvious what 
state officials would have told the judges, beyond explaining the details 
of how the mechanisms work.254  The statute contains no hint about 
 
249. The DOC has the discretion to adjust an inmate’s treatment plan if necessary.  See 
Governor Jim Doyle, supra note 124, at 4 (“This partial veto preserves the intent of the 
provision to direct the department to develop a program plan for the inmate that is designed 
to reduce the risk of reoffending and allows for flexibility to modify the plan as needed.”).  
However, the lack of additional programming could still have stalled earned release if the 
DOC had been reluctant to alter treatment plans.  If earned releases would have occurred 
without necessary programming, because treatment plans were scaled back, this could have 
threatened public safety. 
250. WIS. STAT. § 302.042 (2009–2010). 
251. Id. 
252. See supra Part II.C.6–.7. 
253. Interview with Anthony Streveler May, supra note 189. 
254. Id. (indicating that the DOC had held several meetings with judges to discuss the 
new earned release mechanisms). 
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which inmates should be made eligible for the risk reduction sentence; it 
only says that certain inmates are eligible, and that a judge must 
sentence them to a risk reduction sentence for them to serve one.255  
Likewise, it was unclear when judges were supposed to exercise their 
ability to hold hearings about releases under ERRC release or positive 
adjustment time.  The lack of guidance (particularly from the statutes 
themselves) may have contributed to the sparse and uneven 
implementation of these mechanisms.256 
More broadly, the earned release authorities must cultivate a 
relationship with the state’s judiciary for the mechanisms to be 
implemented smoothly.  Soon after the reforms were passed, prison 
officials told inmates to send letters to the judge requesting to be made 
eligible for program-based release mechanisms that were newly open to 
certain inmates.257  The problem is that there is uncertain legal authority 
for judges to review such letters.  Not only are the letters ex parte, and 
potentially contrary to legislative intent, but they would presumably 
need to be presented as (or interpreted as) sentence modification 
motions for judges to respond to them.258  If the DOC had 
communicated with judges prior to instructing the inmates to write 
letters, judges and inmates alike could have been spared from 
considerable confusion and waste of time. 
All of this said, it is not surprising that, in tough budgetary times, 
new spending for prison programs was unavailable, and overall, judicial 
education efforts were probably sufficient.259  The point here is that 
states need to plan in advance for these elements of the implementation 
process.  In the portion on general principles below in Part III.B, these 
issues are identified as two important tasks, among others, for 
policymakers to accomplish to ensure that earned release actually 
results in significant numbers of inmates being released. 
This Part, in its preliminary evaluation of Wisconsin’s earned release 
mechanisms, has identified both positive aspects of and issues of 
concern with the 2009 and 2011 earned release legislation.  
 
255. WIS. STAT. § 973.031(2009–2010), repealed by 2011 Wis. Act 38, § 92. 
256. Perhaps judges will, as a matter of course, sentence nearly all eligible inmates to 
risk reduction sentences.  One judge claimed to have been doing exactly this: imposing a risk 
reduction sentence whenever the inmate is statutorily eligible.  Anonymous interview (2010). 
257. Interview with Meredith Ross, supra note 108. 
258. For an explanation of Wisconsin sentence modification law, see Norris, supra note 
60. 
259. See supra note 234 and accompanying text. 
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Encouragingly, the 2009 legislation took several steps to protect public 
safety, reduced the judicial role while retaining a veto as a check on 
state officials, and improved the applicability and workability of the 
compassionate release statute.  However, the mechanisms were overly 
numerous and complex, the additional financial resources needed for 
implementation did not appear (with the exception of community 
corrections funds), and implementation was quite uneven.  While the 
2011 legislation reduced the number of mechanisms and retained some 
positive aspects of the 2009 reforms, it inappropriately vested nearly all 
the earned release authority with judges.  Drawing on both these 
experiences and additional sources, this Article next presents four 
principles for the successful implementation of earned release at the 
state level. 
B.  What States Should Do to Ensure the Effectiveness of Earned Release: 
Four Principles 
To ensure effectiveness in the broadest sense, earned release 
legislation in any state should accomplish four main objectives.  First, it 
should provide for measurement and internal controls to make sure that 
earned release does not cause injustice, such as by operating arbitrarily 
or by deepening racial or other sentencing disparities.  Second, 
policymakers should engage in strategic, responsive governance so that 
earned release results in a substantial number of inmates being released 
earlier than would have occurred otherwise.  Third, states should take 
special care to prevent earned release mechanisms from endangering 
public safety.  Fourth, and most importantly for curtailing corrections 
costs, states should accompany new earned release measures with other 
policies aimed at reducing incarceration in ways consistent with public 
safety. 
1. Avoiding Injustice: Data Gathering and Structured Decision-Making 
States should accomplish two important tasks to prevent earned 
release mechanisms from fostering injustice.  First, states should 
monitor the implementation of earned release in a systematic, 
transparent fashion, enabling any disparities or other problematic 
results to be analyzed and corrected.  Second, states should require 
decision-makers to use a structured, principled methodology for making 
and explaining earned release decisions, to avoid arbitrary decisions or 
the development of overly narrow decision-making customs. 
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a.  Transparent Monitoring of the Implementation of Earned Release 
The production of publicly available and reliable statistics on earned 
release is essential for ensuring the fairness of the process.  
Unfortunately, such data has not always been available in Wisconsin. 
While data on the Act 28 earned release programs has been available, 
no data was ever publicly available about judicial sentence modification.  
Using non-public data sources I was able to discover, as noted briefly 
above, that that the rate of approval of sentence adjustment petitions 
varied dramatically by county, which may have reinforced racial 
disparities.260  Such extreme geographic disparity is virtually certain to be 
unjust, because it is simply too vast to be accounted for by the varying 
details of the cases.261  If such data had been made public, it could have 
been used by judges, defense attorneys, or policymakers to reduce some 
of this disparity.262  For example, if judges had had access to information 
about approval rates in other counties and the types of cases receiving 
sentence adjustment, this disparity might well have dissipated.  
Specifically, judges who were reluctant to grant any sentence 
adjustments might have started to grant them if they understood that 
other judges had been doing so for years. 
Presumably, Wisconsin’s geographic disparities in earned release 
decisions at least somewhat diminished from 2009 to 2011, since 
statewide administrative agencies were the main actors in charge of 
earned release.  This is because applying the same methodology to 
prisoners across the state would be unlikely to result in earned release 
being rarely granted to offenders in some counties but commonly 
granted to offenders from elsewhere.263 
However, racial disparities are endemic within all stages of the 
criminal justice system in the United States, and are in dire need of 
attention.264  Wisconsin in particular has among the worst—or even the 
very worst, depending on the measure—racial disparities in 
imprisonment in the country.265  It is important that all sentencing, 
 
260. See supra notes 146–150 and accompanying text.   
261. See id; see also Norris, supra note 38.  As a matter of common sense, it is difficult to 
believe that the objective situations of the inmates in the various counties were so different 
that it was justified to virtually never grant sentence adjustments in some counties, while 
granting nearly half of them in other counties. 
262. See supra note 247 and accompanying text. 
263. See supra notes 248–49 and accompanying text. 
264. See supra note 146 and accompanying text. 
265. See supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
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earned release, and other criminal justice data be regularly compiled 
and made public.  The absence of publicly available data severely limits 
the ability of citizens and policymakers to respond to disparities and 
other problems that exist. 
This issue is particularly important given Professor Harcourt’s 
compelling argument that the increased use of risk assessment 
instruments in earned release may reinforce racial disparities.266  This 
effect could occur because minorities will often have a larger number of 
previous offenses, caused, in part, by heavier policing and drug 
enforcement in inner cities (despite the fact that different racial groups 
use and sell illegal drugs at similar rates).267  Because of the inherent 
unfairness and drastic social consequences of racial disparities in the 
criminal justice system, it is an urgent task for states to measure the 
effects of their policies, including earned release, on racial disparities.268  
However, preliminary data indicates that the 2009 expansion of earned 
release did not increase disparities. 
From 2009 to 2011, 666 inmates achieved earned release from 
Wisconsin prisons.269  In reviewing these discretionary releases the 
department certainly consulted its newly validated risk assessment tool, 
though it is unclear how much of a role it played in each release 
decision.  So far, these earned releases have not exacerbated racial 
disparities.  The releases between 2009 and 2011 were 44.5% black, and 
the prison population during that time ranged from 43% to 44% black.270  
If anything, blacks have been slightly overrepresented in earned 
releases.  Hispanic inmates were also released at a rate virtually 
equivalent to their proportion in the prison population.271   
 
266. See Harcourt, supra note 12 (manuscript at 2, 8–9). 
267. Id.; Norris, supra note 38 (manuscript at 3–4); ALEXANDER, supra note 38, at 7; 
(nothing that “[s]tudies show that people of all colors use and sell illegal drugs at remarkably 
similar rates”). 
268. See generally ALEXANDER, supra note 38. 
269. E-mail from Anthony Streveler, supra note 104.   
270. This is based on data obtained from the Department of Corrections in January 
2011.  E-mail from Anthony Streveler, supra note 104. 
271. E-mail from Anthony Streveler, supra note 104.  The total number of releases—
including those released to another prison sentence being served consecutively—was 685.  Id.  
Eleven of the releasees were Native American, 3 were Asian or Pacific Islander, 302 were 
white, and 64 were Hispanic.  Id.  On January 31, 2010, the inmate population was about 3% 
Native American, 1% Asian/Pacific Islander, 43% African-American, 9% Hispanic, 44% 
white, and 0.5% unknown.  Id.  In June 2009, the racial/ethnic breakdown had been nearly the 
same, though with a slightly larger proportion of African-Americans: about 3% Native 
American, 1% Asian/Pacific Islander, 44% black, 9% Hispanic, 0.5% unknown, and 44% 
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The production and public availability of high-quality data on 
earned release is an essential element of a successful earned release 
system for any state.  No state, and no stage in the criminal justice 
process, is immune from racial disparities or other potential biases.  
Only when state officials and the public have the relevant data can 
progress occur.  In addition, the availability of high-quality data on 
earned release will also allow policymakers to measure the effects of the 
policies—on such things as public safety, disparities, and prison 
population—and adjust them accordingly. 
b.  Ensuring Principled, Recorded Decision-Making 
Another critical method for ensuring fairness and avoiding injustice 
is the enforcement of standards for principled decision-making.  When 
decision-makers must engage in and record an informed, structured 
reasoning process, this reduces the appearance (and reality) of arbitrary 
decision-making.  This reasoning process can be informed by several 
considerations: the permitted legal justifications for earned release, the 
original purposes of the sentence, facts about the individual offender 
and the environment into which he or she will be released, and the 
results of risk assessment tools estimating the future chance of 
recidivism.  This model is informed by the rule-of-law sentencing 
approach, which seeks to make sentencing decisions the product of a 
reasoning process involving the application of a legal standard to facts, 
as opposed to ad hoc, intuitive decisions or overly formulaic 
determinations based on two-dimensional sentencing grids.272 
 
white.  Id.  Asian-Americans were slightly over-represented, and Native Americans slightly 
under-represented, in earned releases, but given the small numbers involved, this could be 
due to chance rather than systematic bias. 
272. See generally Michael M. O’Hear, Appellate Review of Sentence Explanations: 
Learning from the Wisconsin and Federal Experiences, 93 MARQ. L. REV. 751, 782–89 (2009) 
[hereinafter O’Hear, Appellate Review] (presenting eleven rules for the explanation of 
sentences that build on the similar approach based on Wisconsin case law); Smith & Dickey, 
supra note 30, at 6–7 (expounding the rule-of-law approach); Michael E. Smith, Let 
Specificity, Clarity, and Parsimony of Purpose Be Our Guide, 20 LAW & POL’Y 491 (1998).  
Professor O’Hear also presents a cogent rationale for improving sentencing explanations, 
based on evidence about procedural, substantive justice, transparency, and information-
sharing benefits.  O’Hear, Appellate Review, supra, at 753–62; see also Michael M. O’Hear, 
Explaining Sentences, 36 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 459, 479–80 (2009) [hereinafter O’Hear, 
Explaining Sentences] (making the case for a robust requirement for judges to explain their 
sentences, since the explanation process may attenuate the effect of common psychological 
biases on judges and better predispose defendants for rehabilitation).  For a similar 
perspective that focuses on probation decision-making, see Wayne A. Logan, The Importance 
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In rule-of-law sentencing, the judge begins by specifying which 
statutorily approved sentencing objectives, such as public safety and just 
punishment, are of greatest importance to the particular case.273  Then 
the judge considers various facts relevant to sentencing, such as 
mitigating or aggravating factors; substance abuse, or other behavioral 
or psychological issues; the availability of informal social control in the 
community (such as family or work relationships); and the availability 
and effectiveness of various potential sanctions.274  Finally, the judge 
uses these facts to reason about which punishments, and how much 
punishment, would be needed to achieve the objectives of punishment.275  
Arguably state actors should engage in a similar process in their earned 
release decisions, and should record their decision-making rationale, just 
as judges do. 
Besides enhancing fairness, measures to enforce a principled, 
recorded reasoning process may add to the legitimacy, sustainability, 
and effectiveness of earned release by increasing transparency and the 
quality of the decisions, improving inmate conduct, and preventing 
abuses of the earned release system.  First, as Professor Klingele has 
discussed, the lack of transparency in parole decisions was a main factor 
in the large-scale abandonment of indeterminate sentencing.276  
Providing transparency through logically explained and publicly 
available decisions may make earned release systems more acceptable 
to the public and, thus, more sustainable.277  Second, when decision-
makers are forced to articulate a reasoning process they may make 
decisions that are in greater accord with reality.  Third, offenders who 
perceive the decision-makers to have made a fair and reasoned decision 
may be more motivated to improve their behavior and post-release plan, 
because they may feel treated with respect and dignity, and believe that 
the decision-makers will respond appropriately to improvements in the 
offender’s behavior or plans.278  As the psychological literature on 
 
of Purpose in Probation Decision Making, 7 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 171 (2003). 
273. See Smith & Dickey, supra note 30, at 5–6. 
274. See id. at 6–7. 
275. Id. at 6.  Smith and Dickey argue that public safety should always trump just 
punishment if the objectives conflict.  Id.  Thus, an offender should receive a noncustodial 
sentence if such a sentence is more consistent with public safety, even if the judge finds that 
the inmate deserves a prison sentence.  See id. 
276. Klingele, Changing the Sentence, supra note 8, at 497–98. 
277. See id. 
278. See id. at 517. 
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procedural justice has demonstrated, people react far more positively to 
adequately explained decisions.279  Fourth, employing a structured 
reasoning process might make it more difficult to quickly release large 
numbers of inmates, when doing so would be inconsistent with public 
safety.  Such a process would ensure that administrators individually 
analyze each case, enabling them to identify those who pose a high risk.  
Fifth, a required reasoning process could prevent earned release 
authorities from developing institutional customs in which certain 
relevant factors and not others are taken into account, or in which most 
inmates are nearly always released within the same narrow window of 
the percentage of time served.280 
Each component of the decision-making process is critical.  First, 
decision-makers should have access to the complete sentencing 
transcript.281  If the judge determined that certain sentencing objectives 
were more important than others, or that a certain condition (such as 
drug treatment or restitution) was necessary to fulfill an objective, 
decision-makers should take this into account.  When the transcript is 
not available to the decision-makers (who only know the final sentence 
imposed), they are unable to abide by the sentencing judge’s intentions.  
Second, decision-makers should consider the available facts about 
the individual offender, including such things as aggravating and 
mitigating factors in the original offense, institutional conduct, program 
participation, post-release plans, and the availability of treatment and 
supervision in the community.282  Third, the decision-makers should 
review the results of a scientifically validated risk assessment 
 
279. See O’Hear, Explaining Sentences, supra note 272, at 479–80 (discussing procedural 
justice research and arguing that well-explained sentences signals respect for defendants and, 
thus, may encourage institutional adjustment and rehabilitation).  Defendants who hear such 
explanations may also be less likely to appeal the decisions to courts. 
280. Of course, such customs could develop anyway, but a structured reasoning process 
would at least create the opportunity for officials to take a broad range of factors into 
consideration and tailor release decisions to each inmate’s situation. 
281. O’Hear, Appellate Review, supra note 272, at 760 (“A thorough sentence 
explanation creates a permanent record of what the judge found to be important about the 
case and why.  This information may be valuable in a number of respects.”).  Obviously, 
without the entire transcript, it would be impossible to evaluate the sentence explanation in 
context. 
282. Each of these could potentially inform decision-makers’ conclusions about (1) 
whether the offender deserves earned release as a matter of justice and (2) whether releasing 
the offender at that time poses a danger to the community.  See Klingele, Early Demise, supra 
note 9, at 452–56 & n.186 (discussing the need for clarity about the permissible reasons for 
earned release). 
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instrument, while being cautious in their interpretation of it.  Decision-
makers should be familiar enough with the methodology of such 
analyses to identify their weaknesses, and to know when they may be 
less helpful.283  For example, when the model does not take into account 
certain offense characteristics that are important for a particular case, 
the decision-makers may give the risk assessment results less weight 
than in other cases. 
Fourth, decision-makers should have access to sentencing data, 
allowing them to tell whether the offender’s sentence was unusually long 
for the offense or how often they have released similar offenders in the 
past.284  Access to such comparative data could promote greater 
consistency.285  When more than one decision-maker is involved in 
earned release, achieving some measure of consistency may be 
impossible without access to such data. 
Fifth, decision-makers need to structure their decisions with 
reference to the permissible reasons for earned release, as explained in 
statutes and case law.  For example, several of the earned release 
mechanisms that exist now or recently existed (sentence adjustment, 
ERRC release, PAT-B, and PAT-C) allow or allowed earned release 
 
283. For general reviews of the disadvantages of actuarial decision-making in criminal 
justice, see BERNARD HARCOURT, AGAINST PREDICTION: PROFILING, POLICING, AND 
PUNISHING IN AN ACTUARIAL AGE 109–92 (2007); Hannah-Moffat, supra note 11 
(manuscript at 10–12); and Harcourt, supra note 12 (manuscript at 2, 8–9) (debating the 
usefulness of risk assessment in earned release decisions). 
284. Even if the sentence was particularly long for the offense, this does not necessarily 
mean earned release authorities should release the inmate earlier.  Particularly if the judge, in 
the sentencing transcript, provided a rationale for the long sentence, it may be appropriate to 
defer to the judge’s judgment and refrain from taking this issue into account.  This is an 
additional reason why it is important for decision-makers to have access to the full sentencing 
transcript.  More generally, access to sentencing data may allow earned release decisions to 
correct, at least to some degree, disparities among sentences that are apparently unjustified. 
285. See Marc L. Miller, A Map of Sentencing and a Compass for Judges: Sentencing 
Information Systems, Transparency, and the Next Generation of Reform, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 
1351, 1357–70 (2005) (discussing the need for sentencing data, and the potential of sentencing 
information systems to fulfill this need for consistency).  Decades ago, Judge Marvin Frankel 
decried the “wild array of sentencing judgments without any semblance of the consistency 
demanded by the ideal of equal justice.”  MARVIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: 
LAW WITHOUT ORDER 7 (1973).  Without access to information about the sentences other 
judges give for comparable offenses (or the earned releases granted to inmates with 
comparable offenses, institutional behavior, and post-release plans), earned release may 
suffer from similarly dramatic and unjustifiable variation.  This said, it is possible to achieve 
“excessive uniformity,” by demanding that cases similar in certain discrete ways be treated 
identically (as has happened, to some degree, through mandatory minimum sentences).  Marc 
L. Miller, Sentencing Equality Pathology, 54 EMORY L.J. 271, 275–77 (2005). 
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because of an inmate’s “conduct, efforts at and progress in 
rehabilitation, or participation and progress in education, treatment, or 
other correctional programs”; because the inmate is subject to a 
sentence in another jurisdiction or is subject to deportation upon 
release; or when earned release is “otherwise in the interests of 
justice.”286  This last clause is particularly significant. 
The “interests of justice” language gave the decision-maker (the 
judge, the ERRC, or both, depending on the mechanism) broad 
authority to reduce sentences for any defensible reason.  This clause was 
originally included in the TIS-II legislation allowing judges to reduce 
sentences to 75% or 85% of the original sentence.287  The intent of the 
clause was to give judges the freedom to grant sentence reductions 
whenever justified, even if this involves merely reconsidering the 
original facts of the case or the offender’s behavior while incarcerated.288  
This is in contrast to Wisconsin’s common law sentence modification 
doctrine, which allows judges to alter sentences only because of facts 
unknown at sentencing or that happened after sentencing, and forbids 
judges from shortening sentences because of good behavior or 
rehabilitation.289  Thus, the “interests of justice” language in the current 
earned release mechanisms gives decision-makers virtually unhindered 
discretion regarding the specific reasons for approving earned release. 
For example, if an inmate were inexplicably sentenced to a longer 
term than others with similar offense characteristics, or than a co-
defendant with equal or greater culpability, the decision-maker might 
conclude that additional confinement is unnecessary to achieve deserved 
 
286. WIS. STAT. §§ 973.195(1r)(b)(4)–(5) (2009–2010). 
287. WIS. STAT. § 304.06(1)(bg)(3) (2009–2010) (allowing inmates whose crimes were 
committed earlier than October 1, 2009, to petition the ERRC for release after serving 75% 
of their sentence); id. § 304.06(1)(bg)(4) (allowing inmates whose crimes were committed 
earlier than October 1, 2009, to petition the ERRC for release after serving 85% of their 
sentence). 
288. Professor Walter. J. Dickey, who participated in a committee drafting the sentence 
adjustment statute, confirms that this was the committee’s intent.  Under the committee’s 
understanding of the statute, the judge can grant a sentence adjustment “in the interests of 
justice” based solely on a reconsideration of the original facts of the case. Interview with 
Walter J. Dickey, supra note 62. 
289. State v. Kluck, 210 Wis. 2d 1, 7–8, 563 N.W.2d 468, 471 (1997); State v. Champion, 
2002 WI App 267, ¶ 6, 258 Wis. 2d 781, 654 N.W.2d 242 (holding that rehabilitation did not 
qualify as a new factor for TIS inmates, despite the fact that they are not eligible for parole, 
because this would contradict the public policy behind truth-in-sentencing legislation); State 
v. Krueger, 119 Wis. 2d 327, 335, 351 N.W.2d 738, 742 (Wis. Ct. App. 1984). 
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punishment or public safety.290  Likewise, if the inmate provided 
significant assistance to police after conviction, the authority may decide 
that this weighs in favor of his earned release, either because it reduces 
his likelihood of reoffending or because it indicates that a shorter 
sentence would be more just.  In this way, corrections officials may 
choose to allow earned release even for reasons that would not normally 
be considered, except perhaps by judges, in release decisions. 
A critic might object that parole or corrections officials are not well-
suited for deciding what is just and unjust, given their lack of legal 
training.  However, these officials must nonetheless be trusted with such 
decisions when authorized by statute.  First, some elementary training 
can give non-lawyer officials the tools they need to reason about justice 
and the relationship between particular facts and the purposes of the 
sentence.  Second, it is worth pointing out that many have criticized 
contemporary sentencing practices for being essentially lawless, rather 
than the result of applying a legal standard to the facts.291  Reasoning 
through a sentencing or earned release decision does not come naturally 
to anyone, but rather must be learned.  Officials in such situations 
should abide by the plain intent of the legislation, which in this case 
clearly directed state officials to determine what is in the interests of 
justice. 
A general catch-all provision allowing release when “otherwise in 
the interests of justice” is probably a useful and appropriate element of 
earned release legislation for all states to consider.  Such a provision can 
prevent decision-makers from unduly narrowing their inquiry, and 
ignoring facts that are relevant to the objectives of the sentence.  As 
long as decision-makers are trained to engage in a logical reasoning 
process that considers all the relevant facts, purposes of the sentence, 
and permitted grounds for release, there is little reason to think a catch-
all clause would be subject to abuse.  The vast majority of decisions 
would probably center around rehabilitation and post-release 
 
290. The ERRC and the judge (and the DOC as well, which plays a role in many earned 
release decisions) should have access to comparative data on the length of sentences.  If the 
offender was sentenced to a substantially longer term than others with the same offense and 
characteristics, without explanation in the sentencing transcript or reasonable inferences that 
would explain the discrepancy (for example, the presence of a particular aggravating factor), 
then this should weigh in favor of release, since earned release would be in the interests of 
justice.  Of course, if public safety for some reason indicates that earned release is 
inappropriate, this may trump more abstract considerations of injustice. 
291. See Smith & Dickey, supra note 30, at 4–5. 
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circumstances, with miscellaneous justice-related concerns appearing 
relatively rarely. 
In sum, officials should require decision-makers to explain and 
record (with reference to the relevant law, facts, and objectives of the 
sentence) the reasons for approving or denying an earned release 
request.  This requirement could increase the quality of decision-
making, improve inmate conduct, increase the political legitimacy and 
sustainability of earned release, keep decision-makers from 
unnecessarily restricting the factors they consider, and prevent mass 
releases that are not in the interest of public safety.292 
2. Ensuring Implementation Through Strategic Governance 
For earned release legislation to fulfill its purpose, it must result in 
significant numbers of inmates being released earlier than they would 
have been otherwise.  Yet the failure to make the necessary budgetary 
and administrative changes may drastically curtail the effectiveness of 
these mechanisms.  If this occurs, very few inmates may be released, 
rendering the legislation virtually worthless as means to cut corrections 
spending and lower the prison population. 
When states pass new earned release legislation, legislatures or state 
agencies should commission studies that evaluate what preconditions 
are necessary to ensure the earned release mechanisms actually 
accomplish their goals.  At least five elements should be considered: 
programming requirements, judicial education, administrative obstacles, 
collaborative planning, and limiting the number of veto points in 
decision-making.  More generally, a commitment to strategic, 
collaborative governance—involving planning, continual monitoring, 
and responding in a timely way to obstacles as they arise—will enhance 
the effectiveness of earned release mechanisms.  This principle 
corresponds to recent sociological research detailing the weaknesses 
existing in even quite sophisticated forms of governance.293 
For example, in the European Union (EU), in a governance process 
known as the Open Method of Coordination, each country creates 
 
292. For more detailed suggestions on how to implement rule-of-law sentencing, see 
O’Hear, Explaining Sentences, supra note 272, at 479 (developing proposals for further 
requirements to explain sentences). 
293. Jesse J. Norris, From Ballymun to Brussels: Forms of Partnership Governance in 
Irish Social Inclusion Policy, in IRISH BUSINESS AND SOCIETY: GOVERNING, 
PARTICIPATING & TRANSFORMING IN THE 21ST CENTURY 296, 303–04 (John Logan et al. 
eds., 2010). 
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comprehensive analyses of the weaknesses of its social protection 
systems, detailed strategic plans for new policies that would remedy 
these weaknesses, and implementation reports detailing each country’s 
progress in each policy area.294  These documents are regularly evaluated 
by the European Commission and other member states, in terms of 
common objectives agreed to by all countries.295  Similar processes exist 
at the country level, with each municipality creating its own strategic 
plans for improving various policy areas.296  While this collaborative 
approach has had many positive effects, constant attention is still 
necessary to ensure positive results.297 
In particular, as my own research on EU anti-poverty and 
employment policy has demonstrated, central government actors are 
often insufficiently responsive to the problems of implementation as 
they occur on the ground.298  This is true even in systems self-consciously 
designed by policymakers to establish a more collaborative and effective 
mode of governance.299 
While specific approaches to reform vary, many observers now agree 
that effectively implementing ambitious government policies 
necessitates a strong commitment to good governance, involving 
strategic planning, cross-sectoral collaboration, non-state participation, 
regular empirical evaluations, independent monitoring, and 
transparency.300  While the influence of such ideas is spreading, state 
governments are inconsistent in their approach to strategic 
 
294. Jonathan Zeitlin, The Open Method of Coordination in Question, in THE OPEN 
METHOD OF COORDINATION IN ACTION: THE EUROPEAN EMPLOYMENT AND SOCIAL 
INCLUSION STRATEGIES 19, 19–21 (Jonathan Zeitlin & Phillipe Pochet eds., 2005) 
[hereinafter THE OPEN METHOD OF COORDINATION] (outlining the structure of the OMC); 
see also Social Protection & Social Inclusion, EUROPEAN COMM’N: EMPL’T, SOC. AFFAIRS 
AND INCLUSION, available at http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=750&langId=en (last 
visited June 1, 2012) (providing a brief overview of the present OMC system with regard to 
social protection and social inclusion). 
295. Zeitlin, supra note 294, at 21. 
296. Norris, supra note 293 at 301. 
297. See id. at 303–04. 
298. See id. 
299. See id. at 299–300. 
300. See LAURA EDGAR, CLAIRE MARSHALL AND MICHAEL BASSETT, 
PARTNERSHIPS: PUTTING GOOD GOVERNANCE PRINCIPLES IN PRACTICE 5–6 (2006), 
available at http://lin.ca/Files/11119/2006_partnerships.pdf (listing principles of good 
governance); Tony Bovaird & Elke Löffler, Evaluating the Quality of Public Governance: 
Indicators, Models and Methodologies, 69 INT’L REV. ADMIN. SCI. 313, 322 (2003) (noting 
prevalence of good governance paradigm). 
20 - NORRIS (DO NOT DELETE) 7/10/2012  9:19 AM 
2012] THE EARNED RELEASE REVOLUTION 1617 
governance.301  Generally, state-level governance systems in the United 
States are far less advanced than these European processes.  For 
example, nothing resembling the Open Method of Coordination exists, 
and even basic strategic plans outlining the government’s intentions for 
policy implementation are done relatively infrequently.302  Given this 
context, how can states effectively implement earned release policies 
while avoiding common governance problems?  While a comprehensive 
analysis is not possible here, addressing five key issues can help states 
implement earned release effectively. 
First, when earned release mechanisms require program completion 
before release, states should assess whether additional resources need to 
be devoted to these programs.  If additional resources are necessary but 
are not available, inmates who could have gained earned release 
through the mechanisms may not be able to enroll in and complete the 
programming in time.303 
Second, when judges play an important role in earned release, 
policymakers need to engage in a well-organized effort to educate them 
and other relevant actors about these mechanisms.  This should go 
beyond mere education about the mechanisms, instead providing judges 
with detailed information relevant to earned release (and sentencing 
more broadly), and with opportunities for involvement at various levels 
in any criminal justice reform.  In fact, as argued in Part III.C below, 
judicial education and more general judicial involvement in criminal 
justice reform may be critical to the elusive task of bringing the rule of 
law to sentencing. 
Third, states must also address potential obstacles within states 
agencies to ensure implementation proceeds smoothly.  As shown in a 
recent New York Times report and a Vera Institute study on 
compassionate release statutes in various states, few people have been 
released through these statutes, despite the large numbers of eligible 
 
301. One indication that the influence of these ideas is spreading is the popularity in law 
review articles of the “democratic experimentalist” approach originally articulated by Charles 
Sabel and Michael Dorf.  See generally Dorf & Sabel, supra note 228.  Indeed, a Westlaw 
Next search for “democratic /2 experimentalism” yields over 600 secondary sources. 
302. As noted below, there was no strategic plan for implementing Act 28 earned release 
mechanisms, though such a plan did exist with regard to the Becky Young funds.  While 
nothing like the OMC exists in the United States, non-profit organizations have sometimes 
created something somewhat similar, by undergoing similar projects in several states.  The 
primary example here is the Justice Center of the Council of State Governments.  See infra 
notes 313–318 and accompanying text. 
303. See supra Part III.A.7. 
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inmates.304  If a state agency formally or informally creates internal rules 
for the governance of earned release that, purposefully or not, 
discourage earned release—or encourage earned release even when it 
would endanger public safety—state policymakers need to respond to 
such problems by working with the agencies to find solutions.305  Such an 
observation may seem obvious, but state agencies often have problems 
with being responsive in real time, as opposed to waiting until an 
evaluation is commissioned to consider meaningful change.306  Similarly, 
if certain procedures (such as a risk assessment instrument or the actual 
process for an earned release mechanism) need to be developed to allow 
for implementation, policymakers should ensure this occurs without 
delay. 
Moreover, when administrative personnel—perhaps accustomed to 
the previously restrictive earned release regime—appear reluctant to 
approve earned release requests, states must evaluate the situation and 
decide whether replacing the personnel, retraining them, or changing 
their incentives is necessary.  Similar efforts may be necessary when 
other relevant actors play a role in maintaining or increasing the prison 
population, such as community supervision officers, who in some cases 
may view a revocation and re-incarceration as a success rather than a 
failure.  More generally, having established channels for communicating 
problems with on-the-ground implementation to higher policy-making 
levels is important to ensure responsiveness.307 
An example of a constructive approach to overcoming institutional 
obstacles occurred in Milwaukee in 2010.  The Milwaukee Police Chief 
was concerned that the new earned release programs would endanger 
 
304. See supra note 80 and accompanying text. 
305. As an example, “certain early release” sounds relatively simple on paper, but the 
DOC made it into a multi-step process that took so long and put so many people’s 
reputations on the line that it may have discouraged the use of this mechanism.  Specifically, 
the proposed release was first sent to the social worker for evaluation, then the extended 
supervision agent, then the director of community supervision, and finally to the Secretary of 
Corrections.  Interview with Meredith Ross, supra note 108. 
306. See supra note 285 and accompanying text. 
307. This has been discussed elsewhere in terms of establishing “vertical co-ordination 
mechanisms” for communication between different levels of administration, from lower-level 
government staff to mid-level administrators to national policymakers.  See Norris, supra note 
293, at 312; see also Jonathan Zeitlin, The Open Method of Coordination in Action: 
Theoretical Promise, Empirical Realities, Reform Strategy, in THE OPEN METHOD OF 
COORDINATION, supra note 294, at 447, 458. 
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his efforts to reduce crime in the city.308  During meetings between 
Milwaukee Police and DOC staff, the two sides worked out a plan to 
avoid public safety problems related to releasees.309  This involved 
reallocating community corrections agents to ensure that those released 
are closely monitored, including after normal working hours.310  In 
addition, they agreed to increase information sharing between the police 
and the DOC, to facilitate the reentry of offenders into society.311 
This example illustrates how policymakers can overcome 
institutional obstacles.  Collaborative problem-solving between the two 
agencies improved communication, breaking down institutional barriers.  
Without these meetings, the police might have become zealous 
opponents of earned release—for example, they might have spoken at 
court hearings to oppose earned release decisions. 
Fourth, it is important for actors involved in implementation to 
participate in a collaborative, transparent planning process.  This would 
involve the creation of publicly available, regularly updated strategic 
plans detailing the planned implementation of the earned release 
mechanisms (and other related reforms where applicable), the 
systematic consultation of other agencies and non-state individuals and 
entities, and the actual implementation of the plans.  Another important 
element would be a broad-based implementation committee, including 
representatives from the ERRC, different agencies within the DOC, and 
other state agencies involved in implementation (such as local social 
services and police).  This committee, which could include judges, 
victims’ rights advocates, community members, and perhaps even 
former inmates, would meet regularly to exchange information, monitor 
implementation, and make suggestions for change.312 
Finally, states should consider carefully the design of their legislation 
or regulation, including whether the decision-making process gives too 
 
308. Scott Bauer, Prison Release Gets a Second Look—Nonviolent Inmates Let Out to 
Cut Costs, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS, May 5, 2010, at B3; News: Chief: Prisoners’ Release May 
Impact Crime Rate (WISN television broadcast Jan. 21, 2010), available at 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vKDl4oqYRP0. 
309. Bauer, supra note 308. 
310. Id. 
311. Id. 
312. Such a committee might resemble a more specific and focused version of criminal 
justice councils.  These councils, such as the Milwaukee County Criminal Justice Council, 
involve collaboration among a number of stakeholders dedicated to improving the 
effectiveness of the criminal justice system.  See generally Alan J. Borsuk, Get Smart?, MARQ. 
LAW., Fall 2011, at 20. 
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many actors veto power over earned release decisions.  It may make 
sense to give more than one actor a role in the process, perhaps to avoid 
unwise decisions made by a single actor who feels pressure to release 
inmates.  However, the more veto points or bureaucratic hurdles that 
exist, the more likely it is that the process will stall and rarely result in 
release.  If proper checks are placed on executive officials responsible 
for earned release, such that there is little concern that they will abuse 
their power by releasing too many inmates, then it may not be necessary 
to allow other actors (such as judges) to veto their decisions.  
Requirements to record and explain the reasoning process, and the use 
of validated risk assessment instruments, might serve as sufficient 
constraints on decision-makers. 
In addition to these suggestions, the three-fold methodology of the 
Justice Center of the Council for State Governments offers a promising 
template for states to use in planning and implementing earned release 
reforms.  The Justice Center has overseen the implementation of this 
strategy, at least partially, in several states (among them Kansas, Texas, 
Connecticut, and Wisconsin).313  First, Justice Center experts analyze 
crime and criminal justice data, identify neighborhoods with large 
numbers of people under supervision, document the need for additional 
services and resources in these areas, and “develop[] practical, data-
driven, and consensus-based policies that reduce spending on 
corrections to reinvest in strategies that can improve public safety.”314  
Second, experts assist policymakers in effectively implementing the 
policies, including by contributing to implementation plans and progress 
reports.315  Third, the Justice Center ensures that policymakers regularly 
receive updates on the new measures’ impacts on the prison population, 
recidivism, and crime.316  The focus of this strategy on reinvesting 
resources in ways designed to increase public safety and measuring the 
results of reforms is consistent with the thrust of this Article’s 
recommendations. 
 
313. Work in the States, COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS JUSTICE CTR., 
http://justicereinvestment.org/states (last visited June 1, 2012). 
314. See COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS JUSTICE CTR., JUSTICE REINVESTMENT: A 
DATA-DRIVEN APPROACH TO REDUCE CORRECTIONS SPENDING AND REINVEST SAVINGS 
IN STRATEGIES THAT CAN DECREASE CRIME AND STRENGTHEN NEIGHBORHOODS 2 
(2010), available at http://justicereinvestment.org/files/JR_Overview_2010.pdf. 
315. Id. 
316. Id. 
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In sum, policymakers need to consider—while drafting legislation, 
while planning for implementation, and during implementation itself—
whether everything is in place for the earned release mechanisms to 
succeed in releasing significant numbers of inmates, while at the same 
time avoiding harms to public safety.  If additional correctional 
resources are needed, such as rehabilitative programming or community 
supervision, the state should be prepared to provide them as soon as 
they are needed.  Policymakers should systematically educate, and 
remain in communication with judges and other relevant actors, to 
ensure they understand how to play their part in implementing the 
mechanisms.  When legislative, regulatory, or administrative factors 
threaten the effectiveness of earned release programs, policymakers 
should be ready to take action to remove these obstacles.  The 
formation of an ongoing implementation or monitoring committee, with 
members from various interested government and non-government 
entities, ideally with at least one full-time staff member, is an important 
element in ensuring the effectiveness of earned release.317  Limiting the 
number of veto points in earned release decision-making is another 
method for preventing implementation problems.  In any case, as 
suggested by recent social science research, the key is to engage in a 
continual process of strategic governance, monitoring implementation 
and arranging for innovative problem-solving efforts when problems 
arise.318 
3. Making Earned Release Compatible with Public Safety 
Since earned release measures increase the number of offenders in 
the community, policymakers in all states need to ensure that earned 
release does not endanger public safety.  There are three chief methods 
for accomplishing this aim.  First, states could apply earned release 
mostly to those offenders who have not been convicted of violent 
crimes, sexual crimes, or other particularly serious crimes.  Second, 
states should use an empirically validated risk assessment tool for 
making individual release decisions, though without relying on it 
excessively.  Third, policymakers should devote additional resources to 
 
317. See Norris, supra note 293, at 305 (noting the importance of staff members in 
activating and administering innovative governance programs). 
318. See Charles F. Sabel & Jonathan Zeitlin, Learning from Difference: The New 
Architecture of Experimentalist Governance in the EU, 14 EUR. L.J. 271, 276 (2008) 
(emphasizing the role of regular monitoring and comparison across units in enhancing 
accountability in contemporary forms of governance). 
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community supervision, reentry programs, and other measures intended 
to reduce recidivism among those released.  These strategies are 
important for the political survival of earned release, which is vulnerable 
to public relations problems if releasees commit new offenses. 
First, earned release mechanisms should favor offenders who are less 
likely than others to reoffend, and perhaps focus on non-violent 
offenders.  As noted above, many of Wisconsin’s earned release 
mechanisms that were passed in 2009 but abolished in 2011 applied only 
to non-violent offenders, and those that did apply to violent offenders 
required these inmates to serve a larger portion of their sentences.319  
States can select a variety of policy options, such as banning earned 
release for all violent felons, varying the percentage of the sentence the 
inmate must serve depending on the offense classification, and 
increasing the number of actors with veto power over the release of 
more serious offenders. 
It is a legitimate question whether the violent–nonviolent distinction 
is empirically valid as a predictor of recidivism, as opposed to a strategy 
for making earned release politically palatable.  It may be true that 
certain violent offenders are no more likely than nonviolent offenders to 
commit additional offenses—for example, someone who murders a 
spouse might be at lower risk for recidivism than a burglar.320  Even if 
the violent–nonviolent distinction lacks hard empirical backing, it may 
be justified because of the greater value society places on life as opposed 
to property.  That is, even if particular violent offenders may be less 
likely to commit additional crimes, the risk such offenders pose to life 
and limb, however small, may justify erring on the side of caution.  
Ideally, however, earned release policies would only restrict eligibility 
based on empirically valid criteria. 
States should also adopt scientifically valid risk assessment 
instruments, though without relying excessively on them.  Wisconsin’s 
old instrument was developed in the 1980s, and suffered from numerous 
methodological flaws.321  Fortunately, resources are available to states to 
help reform these instruments.  As described earlier, the Justice Center 
 
319. See supra note 101 and accompanying text. 
320. See Klingele, Early Demise, supra note 9, at 450–52 (discussing evidence that some 
non-violent offenders have higher rates of recidivism, and arguing against categorically 
excluding violent offenders from earned release). 
321. EISENBERG ET AL., supra note 194, at iii–iv; see supra note 189 and accompanying 
text. 
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performed a thorough analysis of Wisconsin’s risk assessment 
procedure, which resulted in the much improved assessment tool now in 
use.322  While risk assessment instruments are useful, decision-makers 
need to recognize their limitations and avoid making decisions based 
solely on the instruments, instead of evaluating all the relevant facts.  In 
particular, as stressed recently by Professor Harcourt, policymakers 
should ensure that risk assessment does not unfairly disadvantage 
minorities.323 
Finally, policymakers in all states should accompany earned release 
legislation with measures shown to reduce recidivism among those 
released.  Among these measures could be increased resources for 
community supervision; intensive supervision programs; offender 
reentry initiatives; increased rehabilitative and mental health services; 
and job training and placement programs, including programs directed 
specifically toward those who have achieved earned release.  Resources 
directed toward generally improving conditions in the areas where most 
offenders reside, as the Justice Center advocates, is also a worthwhile 
strategy for reducing recidivism and crime in general.324  As discussed 
previously, Wisconsin established a Council on Offender Reentry, and 
directed the DOC to establish services to reduce recidivism among those 
serving community supervision sentences.325  However, without 
additional resources and coordinated efforts at implementation, such 
measures may be limited in their impact. 
4. Complementing Earned Release with Additional Measures to 
Reduce Incarceration 
States must recognize that new earned release legislation in isolation 
may do relatively little to decrease correctional costs.  A lack of 
necessary programs, judicial vetoes, hesitant or understaffed state 
agencies, delays in developing the procedures needed for 
implementation, or other factors could easily result in only a small 
trickle of earned releases.  In Wisconsin, for example, despite the 
creation of multiple new forms of earned release, only 666 inmates were 
released through them, and most of them were already going to be 
 
322. Interview with Anthony Streveler, supra note 185. 
323. See Harcourt, supra note 12 (manuscript at 2, 8–9). 
324. See supra notes 258–259 and accompanying text. 
325. See supra Part III.A. 
20 - NORRIS (DO NOT DELETE) 7/10/2012  9:19 AM 
1624 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [95:1551 
released in the same year.326  In 2010, the first full year of 
implementation for the measures passed in 2009, only 107 of the earned 
releases (corresponding to about .5% of the prison population) would 
not have occurred sometime that year anyway.327 
Because earned release in many cases may do relatively little to 
decrease incarceration, states should engage in several parallel strategies 
to reduce prison populations, doing their best to integrate and ensure 
the consistency of the measures.  Importantly, these complementary 
strategies to reduce incarceration may be more sustainable than earned 
release, which is vulnerable to backlash from the public and political 
opponents.328  Indeed, Wisconsin Governor Scott Walker campaigned on 
a promise to end earned release, but says he plans to reduce prison 
admissions to keep corrections spending in check.329 
These complementary strategies may also be more effective in 
reducing the overall prison population.330  Studies demonstrate that 
increases in prison admissions, not the length of sentences, were 
overwhelmingly the main cause behind the growing incarceration rates 
of the 1990s.331  In Wisconsin, it seems clear that the vast majority of the 
overall drop in Wisconsin’s prison population was caused by policies 
other than earned release.  In particular, a broad range of diversion 
programs providing alternatives to incarceration was effective in 
 
326. See supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
327. See supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
328. See supra Part II.A. 
329. The current secretary of the Department of Corrections says that he and the 
Governor will “continue to implement innovative strategies to hold prison populations down 
while keeping our communities safe,” mentioning flexible sentencing, community-based 
programs, and re-entry initiatives.  Hall, supra note 17. 
330. The likelihood of opposition to earned release has caused some state lawmakers to 
avoid earned release proposals, focusing on other criminal justice reforms instead.  An Idaho 
official said that “the measures the state’s already taking—problem-solving courts, developing 
alternatives to incarceration, treatment programs, and a ‘violation matrix’—offer better hope 
of results.  We have really seen a significant reduction, . . . [and we’re a thousand inmates 
below where we thought we’d be in 2008.”  Betsy Z. Russell, Eye on Boise: Prisons: Spending 
Less Now . . ., SPOKESMAN-REVIEW (Boise, Idaho) (Feb. 5, 2010, 8:36 AM), http://www. 
spokesman.com/blogs/boise/2010/feb/05/prisons-spending-less-now/ (internal quotation marks 
omitted) (quoting Idaho Corrections Director Brent Reinke). 
331. John F. Pfaff, The Causes of Growth in Prison Admissions and Population 37–38 
(Working Paper 2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=19905
08 (presenting research demonstrating that “(1) prison admissions, rather than time served, 
have been the primary driver of prison growth, and that (2) at least since the late 1980s, the 
main force behind rising admissions has been rising felony filings (and filings per arrest)”).  
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reducing prison admissions, along with re-entry programs, additional 
drug treatment, and efforts to reduce revocation rates.332 
A variety of strategies are available to reduce the prison population.  
Among them are (a) systematic efforts to reduce revocations from 
probation, parole, or extended supervision; (b) reentry programs aimed 
at preventing recidivism; (c) additional resources or statutory authority 
for prison diversion programs such as drug courts; (d) reducing statutory 
penalties or adjusting sentencing guidelines downward for certain 
nonviolent offenses; and (e) prosecutors and judges using their 
discretion to seek probation and treatment rather than incarceration for 
drug-related crimes and other minor offenses.  As a detailed discussion 
of these options is beyond the scope of the Article, this Part reviews 
each of them only briefly. 
Strategies for reducing the revocation rate of offenders serving 
community supervision sentences, along with limitations on the 
sentences judges can impose after revocation, are among the most 
promising methods of reducing incarceration.  In many areas, revocation 
rates are extremely high, and offenders revoked for technical offenses 
often account for a large proportion of new prison inmates.333  Some 
states have succeeded in dramatically reducing revocation rates, 
resulting in significant savings.334  Restrictions on post-revocation 
sentencing may also be effective in reducing prison populations.  A 
measure preventing judges from sentencing offenders after revocation 
for more than six months of incarceration passed the Wisconsin 
legislature, only to be vetoed by Governor Jim Doyle.335  Several states 
already place similar restrictions on the incarceration of offenders 
serving community supervision sentences.336 
 
332. E-mail from Anthony Streveler, supra note 104. 
333. See supra note 209 and accompanying text; see also Clear & Schrantz, supra note 1, 
at 141S (noting that for states with high rates of technical revocations, reducing these 
revocations can be an important strategy for reducing prison population). 
334. Cindy Horswell, Texas Cuts Costs Amid Prison Reform: New Treatment Programs 
Credited as Prison Population Slows, CHRON.COM (Dec. 15, 2009), http://www.chron. 
com/news/houston-texas/article/Treatment-efforts-credited-as-prison-population-1750304.php 
(“The state reports a dramatic 25 percent drop in parole violators being returned to prison 
while the number of those being paroled has increased by 3 percent.”); Adam Serwer, When 
Slim Budgets Mean Better Prisons, AMER. PROSPECT (Mar. 18, 2009), 
http://www.prospect.org/cs/articles?article=when_slim_budgets_mean_better_prisons (noting 
that Justice Center-supported reforms in Kansas led to a 48% decrease in revocations). 
335. 2009 WI Act 28, § 2726 (renumbering and amending WIS. STAT. § 302.113(9)). 
336. ALISON LAWRENCE, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGS., PROBATION AND 
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Reentry programs also show promise as a strategy to reduce 
incarceration.  The federal Second Chance Act of 2007 provided federal 
funds to states for programs aimed at promoting the integration of 
offenders into communities and thus reducing recidivism.337  Over 100 
million dollars in grants were available for the 2010 fiscal year.338  More 
than just a funding phenomenon, interest in reentry policy around the 
country has reached such a level that observers now commonly speak of 
a “reentry movement.”339  The movement appears to have spawned a 
number of effective approaches for reducing recidivism.340  States hoping 
to reduce corrections spending would benefit from investing state 
resources in reentry efforts, in addition to pursuing federal grants.  As 
noted above, Wisconsin has established a Council on Offender Reentry 
to coordinate and study reentry programs, though it is too early to 
evaluate its progress.341   
Diversion programs, which divert inmates to treatment and non-
custodial sanctions instead of incarceration, are another very useful tool 
for decreasing prison populations.  Evaluations of diversion programs 
have shown that they can reduce incarceration without increasing public 
safety risks.342  Specialized courts such as drug courts, which function as 
diversion programs, have also succeeded in reducing incarceration and 
recidivism.343  However, caution must be exercised to ensure that the 
programs do not simply “widen the net” by prosecuting those who 
 
PAROLE VIOLATIONS: STATE RESPONSES 4–5 (2008), available at 
http://www.ncsl.org/print/cj/violationsreport.pdf. 
337. Michael M. O’Hear, The Second Chance Act and the Future of Reentry Reform, 20 
FED. SENT’G REP. 75, 75–76 (2007) [hereinafter O’Hear, Second Chance]; Second Chance 
Act, NATIONAL RE-ENTRY RESOURCE CENTER, http://www.nationalreentryresourcecenter 
.org/about/second-chance-act (last visited June 1, 2012). 
338. O’Hear, Second Chance, supra note 337, at 76. 
339. See, e.g., Jeremy Travis, Reflections on the Reentry Movement, 20 FED. SENT’G REP. 
84, 84–85 (2007). 
340. Id. 
341. See supra Part III.A.4. 
342. Henry J. Steadman & Michelle Naples, Assessing the Effectiveness of Jail Diversion 
Programs for Persons with Serious Mental Illness and Co-Occurring Substance Use Disorders, 
23 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 163, 168–70 (2005). 
343. See C. WEST HUDDLESTON, III, ET AL., NAT’L DRUG CT. INST., PAINTING THE 
CURRENT PICTURE: A NATIONAL REPORT CARD ON DRUG COURTS AND OTHER 
PROBLEM-SOLVING COURT PROGRAMS IN THE UNITED STATES 6–8 (2008), available at 
http://www.ndci.org/sites/default/files/ndci/PCPII1_web%5B1%5D.pdf (summarizing 
research on drug court effectiveness). 
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would previously have been ignored (or treated leniently) by the 
criminal justice system.344 
Reducing criminal penalties and lowering sentencing guidelines for 
particular offenses may also be effective means of reducing 
incarceration without endangering the public.  These measures could 
range from making possession of small amounts of marijuana or other 
drugs punishable only by a fine to lowering the maximum penalties for 
other nonviolent offenses and victimless crimes.  Several cities and 
states have recently decriminalized or are currently considering 
decriminalizing marijuana, often motivated by the potential budgetary 
savings.345  Repealing harsh sentencing laws, such as three-strikes 
provisions and mandatory minimum sentences, could lead to significant 
savings in a number of states.  In fact, several states have recently 
repealed mandatory minimum sentences.346 
Even if criminal penalties remain the same, prosecutors and judges 
can make a significant difference by acting within their discretion to 
 
344. William G. Meyer & A. William Ritter, Drug Courts Work, 14 FED. SENT’G REP. 
179, 180 (2002) (defending drug courts against claims of “net widen[ing],” by noting the 
absence of evidence for such an effect). 
345. Jim Altman, Bill to Ease Pot Law Penalties Draws Fire, HARTFORD COURANT 
(Conn.), Mar. 20, 2010, at B3 (noting aim of decriminalizing marijuana possession is to “save 
the state the expense of prosecuting relatively minor drug offenses.”); Tim Johnson, Mexico 
Bristles as Some U.S. States Move to Relax Marijuana Laws, STAR-LEDGER (Newark, N.J.), 
Mar. 26, 2010, at 9 (discussing impact on Mexico of U.S. states decriminalizing small amounts 
of marijuana possession); Terry Date, Testimony Heard on Marijuana Bill: Legislation Would 
Decriminalize Small Amounts, EAGLE-TRIB. (N. Andover, Mass.) (Apr. 7, 2010), 
http://www.eagletribune.com/newhampshire/x908930224/Testimony-heard-on-marijuana-bill 
(awaiting recommendation from committee on bill that would decriminalize marijuana 
possession of a quarter-ounce or less); Norma Love, NH House Approves Decriminalizing 
Marijuana, BOSTON.COM (Mar. 10, 2010), http://www.boston.com/news/local/new_hampshire/ 
articles/2010/03/10/nh_house_considering_decriminalizing_marijuana/; Craig McCoy et al., 
Philadelphia to Ease Marijuana Penalty, PHILA. INQUIRER (Apr. 5, 2010), http://articles.phi 
lly.com/2010-04-05/news/24956838_1_marijuana-court-system-possession-of-small-amounts 
(discussing new policy of fining marijuana possession of less than thirty grams rather than add 
to criminal record); William M. Welchand & Donna Leinwand, Slowly, States Are Lessening 
Limits on Marijuana, USATODAY.COM (Mar. 9, 2010), http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation
/2010-03-08-marijuana_N.htm. 
346. Jeremy Peters, Albany Reaches Deal to Repeal ‘70s Drug Laws, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 
26, 2009, at A1; see also Families Against Mandatory Minimums, State Responses to 
Mandatory Minimum Laws, FAMILIES AGAINST 
MANDATORY MINIMUMS (Feb. 24, 2010), http://www.famm.org/Repository/Files/State%20R
esponses%20to%20Mandatory%20Minimum%20Laws%20Alphabetically%20_2-23-10_%5 
B1%5D.pdf (describing how Rhode Island, Michigan, New Mexico, Indiana, Louisiana, 
Mississippi, and North Dakota have eliminated certain mandatory minimum sentencing 
statutes). 
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favor treatment, community supervision, and other programs over 
incarceration.  Arguably, the most crucial step in both reducing prison 
populations and diminishing the deep racial disparities in the criminal 
justice system is to drastically scale back the War on Drugs, focusing on 
treatment rather than punishment.  This would mean refraining in most 
cases from sentencing drug offenders to incarceration unless they have 
committed other non-drug offenses that clearly indicate that 
incarceration is needed to protect the public.  After all, whites and 
blacks use illegal drugs at the same rates, yet African-Americans are 
many times more likely to be stopped, searched, arrested, charged, 
convicted, and sentenced to prison for drug crimes.347  In some states, 
blacks are from twenty to fifty times more likely to be incarcerated for 
drug offenses.348  In general, policy changes meant to reduce racial 
disparities should usually serve to decrease prison populations (that is, 
unless they move toward parity by imprisoning more whites). 
These complementary strategies are important for states to consider 
in tandem with earned release reforms, in part because they may be 
more sustainable, even in the short term.  Indeed, earned release plans 
in some states have been discontinued shortly after their inception.349  
Most of these other strategies are unlikely to cause controversy, since, 
for example, few are likely to complain about a drop in the rate of 
revocations for technical violations of parole.  Moreover, because these 
strategies all operate to reduce incarceration at the front end, they are 
likely to be more effective than earned release in reducing incarceration 
levels and corrections costs. 
Wisconsin’s recent history bears this out.  The vast majority of the 
recent drop in Wisconsin’s prison population was due to diversion 
programs and other reforms, not earned release.350  Likewise, among the 
state’s various criminal justice reforms, only earned release attracted 
significant controversy.351  Indeed, as mentioned above, Governor 
Walker largely repealed earned release, but he has also stated that he 
 
347. See ALEXANDER, supra note 38, at 7; see also supra note 38 (addressing racial 
disparities in the criminal justice system). 
348. Id. 
349. See supra Part II.A; Klingele, Early Demise, supra note 9, at 432–35. 
350. See supra note 290 and accompanying text. 
351. However, other reforms were not completely immune from criticism: a scathing 
news report uncovered glaring flaws of one Milwaukee diversion program.  Ben Poston & 
Daniel Bice, Some Cases in Deferred Prosecution Process Raise Eyebrows, JSONLINE (Dec. 
12, 2010), http://www.jsonline.com/watchdog/watchdogreports/111733029.html. 
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supports efforts to lower correction costs by lowering prison 
admissions.352 
C.  Implications for Rule-of-Law Sentencing 
One advantage of this four-pronged approach to earned release 
reforms is that it could help achieve the elusive goal of bringing the rule 
of law to sentencing.  As Judge Marvin Frankel observed, sentencing 
has long been characterized by the absence of law.353  This can result in 
arbitrary decisions unguided by a legal standard, and wide disparities 
among similar offenders.  Popular approaches to narrow sentencing 
discretion, particularly sentencing guidelines, have been overly 
formulaic, giving undue attention to two factors only: the offense 
category and the number of previous offenses.354  Professors Michael 
Smith and Walter Dickey of the University of Wisconsin Law School 
have proposed the “rule-of-law sentencing” model, which is highly 
promising but has not yet been achieved in practice.355 
This model, described in more detail above in Part III.B.1, is a 
compelling approach to bringing a legal reasoning process to judicial 
sentencing decisions.  Yet it remains unclear how rule-of-law sentencing 
might be implemented.  Proponents of rule-of-law sentencing may have 
presumed originally that a comprehensive statute or common law 
doctrine imposed from above could, if enforced by appellate courts, 
cause rule-of-law sentencing to gain hold among trial court judges.  
However, even though the Wisconsin Supreme Court decision in State v. 
Gallion conforms rather closely to the ideas of rule-of-law sentencing, 
appellate courts have declined to reverse inadequately reasoned 
sentences, and the impact of the ruling on sentencing is unclear.356 
This Article suggests an alternative model for the diffusion of rule-
of-law sentencing, based on two main mechanisms.  First, the 
administrative officials making earned release decisions—which are 
after all a form of sentencing decision—should be required to record 
their reasoning process with reference to sentencing objectives, relevant 
facts, and elements of the sentence.  Ideally, community supervision 
 
352. See supra note 59 and accompanying text. 
353. See Marvin E. Frankel, Lawlessness in Sentencing, 41 U. CIN. L. REV. 1 (1972) 
(reprinting the 1971 lecture); see also FRANKEL, supra note 282, at 7. 
354. See Smith & Dickey, supra note 30, at 5. 
355. See id. 
356. See Norris, supra note 60. 
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agents would also engage in a similar reasoning process when deciding 
how to enforce conditions of parole, including whether to recommend 
revocation, since these decisions are in effect sentencing decisions as 
well.  By expanding the structured, recorded exercise of discretion from 
judges to other government actors involved in sentencing-related 
decisions, this approach would bring the rule of law to the 
administrative state, enhancing both procedural justice and the quality 
of decision-making. 
Second, judges should be encouraged to become actively involved in 
every aspect of criminal justice reform.  This could enhance rule-of-law 
sentencing by (a) increasing their knowledge of what sentencing options 
are already available and what programs have been shown to be most 
effective; (b) disseminating knowledge about innovative sentencing 
practices such as new kinds of courts or diversion programs; (c) 
increasing judges’ awareness of general issues in criminal justice reform, 
such as the factors driving racial disparities and the growing movement 
to sentence lower-level offenders to treatment and supervision rather 
than prison; and (d) fostering a dialogue among judges about the proper 
use of sentencing discretion.357  If more judges became involved and 
these four results occurred, this could foster the development of rule-of-
law sentencing norms in a bottom-up fashion.  Such a development may 
be more productive than relying on legal doctrines like Gallion to 
change sentencing practices. 
Increasing the participation of judges may also improve the 
governance of criminal justice reforms by taking into account the 
judicial role and individual judges’ perspectives, in these reforms.  
Indeed, a review of local criminal justice policy councils indicated that 
 
357. The most difficult aspect of bringing the rule of law to sentencing is arguably the 
task of giving judges the information they need to determine what punishment will achieve 
public safety.  This is because judges rarely have access to rich information about which 
programs are available in prison and in the community, their effectiveness, and the existence 
of social supports in the offender’s community.  In the absence of realistic information about 
the usefulness of their sentencing options, judges’ fact-finding at sentencing is often mainly 
confined to noting mitigating and aggravating factors.  Without data on recidivism, judges are 
unlikely to know whether intensive community sanctions, another prison diversion program, 
or a prison term is more likely to protect public safety.  Judges in such situations might 
understandably err on the side of incarceration because of its temporary incapacitation effect, 
even when noncustodial sanctions may be more effective in the long term.  Widespread 
judicial involvement in criminal justice reforms may enhance judge’s knowledge of these 
matters, improving their ability to impose sentences that best accomplish the objectives of the 
sentence. 
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the presence and especially leadership of a judge was often the main 
factor behind the success of the council.358  Encouragingly, the Wisconsin 
legislation mandating the creation of a Council on Offender Reentry 
specifically requires a judge or former judge to serve on the council.359  
More generally, Professors Cecelia Klingele, Michael Scott, and Walter 
Dickey have argued compellingly that “reimagining criminal justice” 
should involve “judges as organizers” who take an “active role in 
problem-solving.”360 
Indeed, each criminal justice reform—whether it is the creation of 
reentry policy councils, the introduction of new earned release 
mechanisms, the use of alternative courts like drug courts, or 
experimentation with intensive community sanctions—presents a 
myriad of needs for judicial education and opportunities for judicial 
involvement.  By integrating judges into sentencing policy and by having 
non-judicial sentencing decision-makers abide by reasoning 
requirements similar to those required of judges, the rule-of-law 
sentencing approach may take root in a sustainable way. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
This Article uses the example of Wisconsin and recent scholarship to 
develop general lessons for other states with earned released policies.  
Wisconsin’s 2009 earned release legislation had several positive 
elements, including a decrease in the judicial role, a widening of 
compassionate release, special attention to protecting public safety, and 
initiatives to reduce recidivism and revocations from community 
supervision sentences.  It suffered, however, from uneven 
implementation and excessive complexity, and never had the additional 
resources that were probably needed for full implementation (with the 
exception of new funding for community corrections). 
Drawing on Wisconsin’s example and recent criminal justice and 
governance scholarship, this Article outlines four principles for states to 
 
358. See RICHARD P. STOKER, STATE JUSTICE INST. CTR. FOR EFFECTIVE PUB. 
POLICY, FIVE REASONS WHY JUDGES SHOULD BECOME MORE INVOLVED IN 
ESTABLISHING, LEADING, AND PARTICIPATING ON COLLABORATIVE, POLICY-FOCUSED 
TEAMS 2–6 (2006), available at http://www.wicourts.gov/about/organization/programs/docs/ 
judgerolereport.pdf. 
359. WIS. STAT. § 15.145(5) (2009–2010). 
360. Cecelia Klingele et al., Reimagining Criminal Justice, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 953, 982–85 
(2010). 
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use in ensuring the success of earned release legislation.  These include 
provisions for preventing injustice through transparent monitoring and 
structured decision-making, ensuring implementation through strategic 
governance, making earned release compatible with public safety, and 
complementing earned release with other, perhaps more effective and 
sustainable, methods of reducing prison populations and correctional 
costs.  Along with increasing the effectiveness of earned release policies, 
these principles may help achieve the goal of bringing the rule of law to 
the sentencing process. 
The Article also provides some preliminary empirical responses to 
pressing questions about earned release.  First, in support of the 
argument that administrators, rather than judges, should be the main 
actors behind earned release, I present data showing wide geographic 
disparities in the approval rates under the judicial sentence adjustment 
mechanism, which may have reinforced the state’s racial disparities.  
Second, responding to concerns that using risk assessment tools to 
inform earned release decisions would exacerbate racial disparities, this 
Article shows that this did not occur in Wisconsin’s expanded earned 
release mechanisms in effect from 2009 to 2011.  Third, supporting 
claims that earned release may have a relatively small role to play in 
reducing the prison population, I show that even Wisconsin’s numerous 
new earned release mechanisms had little impact on the state’s prison 
population. 
Earned release policy is a high-stakes game, with potentially vast 
consequences.  Unwisely implemented measures could cause backlashes 
that prevent policymakers from breaking out of the tough-on-crime 
paradigm of the 1990s, reinforcing the escalating prison costs and over-
incarceration the paradigm brought about.  Well-executed reforms, in 
contrast, could help bring about a new sentencing era, characterized by 
less imprisonment and enhanced public safety.  This Article’s proposed 
principles for successfully planning and implementing earned release 
reforms are intended both to serve as a tentative guide for states, and to 
encourage a dialogue among academics and practitioners about best 
practices in this area of criminal justice reform. 
Further research on this topic should systematically assess how the 
earned release revolution has fared in other states.  Have some states 
succeeded in releasing significant numbers of inmates without causing 
public safety problems?  Has decreasing prison admissions been a more 
successful strategy reducing prison populations?  Has earned release 
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worsened or improved racial disparities in any states?  Research 
answering these questions could potentially test the four principles 
advocated in this article, determining whether their use predicts the 
success of earned release mechanisms. 
